On the external validity of laboratory experiments by Boly, Amadou
 
Direction des bibliothèques 
 
 
 
AVIS 
 
Ce document a été numérisé par la Division de la gestion des documents et 
des archives de l’Université de Montréal. 
 
L’auteur a autorisé l’Université de Montréal à reproduire et diffuser, en totalité 
ou en partie, par quelque moyen que ce soit et sur quelque support que ce 
soit, et exclusivement à des fins non lucratives d’enseignement et de 
recherche, des copies de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse.  
 
L’auteur et les coauteurs le cas échéant conservent la propriété du droit 
d’auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent ce document. Ni la thèse ou le 
mémoire, ni des extraits substantiels de ce document, ne doivent être 
imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l’autorisation de l’auteur.  
 
Afin de se conformer à la Loi canadienne sur la protection des 
renseignements personnels, quelques formulaires secondaires, coordonnées 
ou signatures intégrées au texte ont pu être enlevés de ce document. Bien 
que cela ait pu affecter la pagination, il n’y a aucun contenu manquant. 
 
NOTICE 
 
This document was digitized by the Records Management & Archives 
Division of Université de Montréal. 
 
The author of this thesis or dissertation has granted a nonexclusive license 
allowing Université de Montréal to reproduce and publish the document, in 
part or in whole, and in any format, solely for noncommercial educational and 
research purposes. 
 
The author and co-authors if applicable retain copyright ownership and moral 
rights in this document. Neither the whole thesis or dissertation, nor 
substantial extracts from it, may be printed or otherwise reproduced without 
the author’s permission. 
 
In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms, contact 
information or signatures may have been removed from the document. While 
this may affect the document page count, it does not represent any loss of 
content from the document.  
 
 
 
Université de Montréal 
On the external validity of laboratory 
experiments 
par 
Amadou Boly 
Département de sciences économiques 
Faculté des arts et des sciences 
Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures 
en vue de l'obtention du grade de 
Philosophire Doctor (Ph.D.) 
en sciences économiques 
Mai 2009 
© Amadou Boly, 2009 
Université de Montréal 
Faculté des arts et des sciences 
. Cette thèse intitulée: 
On the external validity of laboratory 
experiments 
présentée par 
Amadou Boly 
a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes : 
Abraham J. Hollander 
président-rapporteur 
Olivier Armantier 
directeur de recherche 
Sidartha Gordon 
membre du jury 
Étienne de Villemeur 
examinateur externe 
représentant du doyen de la FES 
Université de Mop.tréal 
Faculté des arts et des sciences 
Cette thèse intitulée : 
On the external validity of laboratory 
experiments 
présentée par 
Amadou Boly 
a été évaluée par un jury composé des personnes suivantes: 
Abraham J. Hollander 
président-rapporteur 
Olivier Armantier 
directeur de recherche 
Sidartha Gordon 
membre du jury 
Soiliou D. Namoro 
examinateur externe 
représentant du doyen de la FES 
Sommaire 
Définie comme la possibilité de généraliser les résultats obtenus en labo-
ratoire à des situations du monde réel, la validité externe est une préoccupa-
tion majeure en économie expérimentale. La présente thèse vise à analyser 
la généralisabilité des résultats obtenus en laboratoire en comparant une ex-
périence en laboratoire à Montréal (Canada) et une expérience sur le terrain à 
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). La principale différence entre le laboratoire et 
le terrain est que les participants sur le terrain ne savent pas qu'ils participent 
à une expérience. Cette thèse comporte trois chapitres. 
Le chapitre 1 décrit le design de l'expérience. L'idée principale est de repro-
duire un contexte académique dans lequel des correcteurs corrigent 20 copies 
d'examen appartenant à des candidats. Les copies sont numérotées de 01 à 20, 
la copie 11 venant avec un pot-de-vin dans plusieurs sessions expérimentales. 
Un tel design permet d'étudier à la fois les incitations au travail en se concen-
trant sur les 10 premières copies (chapitre 2), et la corruption à travers l'analyse 
de la décision des correcteurs d'accepter ou non le pot-de-vin (chapitre 3). 
Le chapitre 2 analyse les effets du contrôle comme mécanisme d'incitation, 
dans un contexte où les travailleurs sont motivés par une "mission". Les ré-
sultats suggèrent que le contrôle augmente significativement l'effort dans un 
tel contexte. Afin de tester la robustesse des résultats obtenus en laboratoire, 
nous les comparons aux résultats de l'expérience conduite sur le terrain à Oua-
gadougou (Burkina Faso). La direction et la magnitude de tous les effets de 
traitement sont les mêmes entre le laboratoire à Montréal et le terrain à Oua-
gadougou. 
Le chapitre 3 analyse la validité externe des expériences sur la corruption. 
11 
Dans notre expérience, un candidat offre un pot-de-vin à un correcteur afin 
d'obtenir une meilleure note. Nous trouvons que la direction et la magnitude 
de la plupart des effets de traitement sont statistiquement indistincts entre le 
laboratoire et le terrain. En particulier, augmenter la rémunération des cor-
recteurs réduit la probabilité d'accepter le pot-de-vin aussi bien en laboratoire 
que sur le terrain. Nous identifions également plusieurs micro-déterminants de 
la corruption. 
Mots clés: Expérience en laboratoire, Expérience sur le terrain, Mécan-
ismes incitatifs, Corruption. 
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Summary 
External validity, which is defined as the possibility of generalizing lab re-
sults to real-life situations, has been a fundamental concern to experimental 
economists. This thesis addresses the external validity question by comparing 
a lab experiment conducted in Montreal (Canada) to a field experiment con-
ducted in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). The main difference between the lab 
and the field is that subjects in the field are not aware they are taking part in 
an experiment. There are three chapt ers in this thesis. 
Chapter 1 presents the experimental design. The basic idea of the exper-
iment is to reproduce an educational setting in which graders are required to 
grade 20 exam papers. The papers are numbered and ranked from 01 to 20, 
with paper Il coming with a bribe in several experimental sessions. Such a 
design allows the study of work incentives by focusing on the 10 first papers 
(chapter 2), and of corrupt behavior by analyzing the grader's decision regard-
ing the bribe offer (chapter 3). 
Chapter 2 analyzes the crowding-out effect of monitoring in a mission-
oriented work context. We find that monitoring significantly increases graders' 
effort on average in such a context. To test the robustness of the results ob-
tained in the lab in Montreal, we compare them to those of the field experiment 
conducted in Ouagadougou. The direction and the magnitude of all treatment 
effects are found to be fully consistent between the lab in Montreal and the 
field in Ouagadougou. 
Chapter 3 makes an attempt at testing the external validity of corruption 
IV 
experiments by moving from the lab in a developed country, to where corruption 
may matter the most, the field in a developing country. In this experiment, a 
candidate proposes a bribe to a grader in order to obtain a better grade. We 
find the direction and the magnitude of most treatment effects to be statistically 
indistinguishable between the lab and the field. In particular, increasing the 
graders' wage reduces in both environments the probability to accept the bribe. 
We also identify sever al micro-determinants of corruption. 
Key Words: Lab experiments, Field experiments, Incentives, Corruption. 
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Introduction générale 
Laboratory experiments are now a weIl-established tool in empirical eco-
nomic analysis. A key advantage of this approach is the possibility to impIe-
ment exogenous changes in a variable of interest, to study its effect on another 
one. The internaI validity of a lab experiment refers to this ability to make 
causal inferences by exogenously manipulating a variable. External validity, on 
the other hand, refers to the ability to generalize lab results to settings outside 
the lab (see e.g. Loewenstein 1999).1 The main object of this thesis is to an-
alyze the generalizability of lab results by moving from the lab in a developed 
country to the field in a developing country. To do so, we conducted the "same" 
ex periment in the lab in Montreal (Canada) and in the field in Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso), in order to compare the results. 
External validity has long been a subject of concern in experimental eco-
nomics.2 However, its importance arguably depends on the specific goals of 
the experiment (Schram 2005). For example, Kagel and Roth (1995, p. 22) 
distinguish three categories of objectives. The first category, "Speaking to The-
orists", aims at testing the predictions of theoretical models. In this category, 
internaI validity relative to the theory tested may be considered more important 
than external validity. The second category, "Searching for Facts" , attempts to 
establish empirical regularities in situations where economic theories are scant. 
As evidence accumulates, theories about the observed behaviors may be pro-
posed and tested. The third category, "Whispering in the Ears of the Princes" 
aims at advising policy makers. Because most lab experiments may faIl into the 
1 Besides "external validity" , other conunonly used tenus are "parallelism" and "ecological 
validity" . 
2 For a flavor of the debate about external validity, see e.g. Campbell and Stanley (1963), 
Smith (1982), Levitt and List (2007a, 2007b). 
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first category, experimental economists have typically put emphasis on internaI 
validity at the expense of external validity (see e.g. Bardsley 2005, Schram 
2005). External validity may be an important issue in the last two categories 
however, as the main objective is to say something about behavior outside the 
laboratory. 
A major obstacle to the generalizability of lab results relates to the artifi-
ciality of the setting (Schram 2005).3 Artificiality may come from the fact that 
sorne relevant factors in the real world are omitted in the lab setting which 
requires simplification for tractability. A proposed strategy to solve this prob-
lem may be through "controlled" replication. Indeed, in order to claim that 
result A cannot happen outside the artificial setting E, one must identify a 
factor K that is not present in E and is at work in the real world (Guala 2002). 
Testing this claim 'would then require to construct a setting El which includes 
the factor K. However, in certain situations, sorne relevant factors may happen 
only in the real world and can hardly be reproduced in lab settings (Bardsley 
2005). In those situations, lab experiments may not be the appropriate tool.-1 
To address the concern for external validity, a growing number of field 
experiments have been conducted.5 Harrison and List (2004) propose six factors 
:IOne of the earliest economic experiments may be traced back to Thurstone (1931), 
who attempted to derive empirically individual indifference curves. This experiment was 
subsequently criticized due to the hypothetical nature of the subjects' choices, which relates 
to the artificiality issue (see e.g. Wallis and Friedman 1942). 
~For example, studies of tax compliances may lack the authority relationship between 
the government and the citizens. "People might recognize a civic or legal dut y to pay ta.xes 
whilst not recognizing a dut y to be honest to experimenters in labs, or indeed vice versa" 
(Bardsley 2005). 
,')For example, departing from traditionallab practices, experimental economists have e.g. 
recruited non-standard subjects instead of students (e.g. Henrich et al. 2001, Fehr and List 
2004, Harrison and List 2008), used framed instead of neutral instructions (e.g. Abbink and 
Hennig-Schmidt 2006, Alatas et al. 2009, List 2006, Harrison and List 2008), utilized field 
goods rather than induced valuations (e.g. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1990, Bateman 
et al. 1997, Rutstrom 1998), or given real-effort tasks to subjects instead of abstract chosen 
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that canbe used to determine the field context of an experiment. These factors 
are: the nature of the subject pool, the nature of the information that the 
subjects bring to the task, the nature of the commodity, the nature of the 
task or trading rules applied, the nature of the stakes, and the environment in 
which the subjects operate. These factors allow distinguishing four broad types 
of experiment: conventional lab experiments, artefactual field experiments, 
framed field experiments and natural field experiments. A conventional lab 
experiment uses a standard subject pool of students, an abstract framing, and 
an imposed set of rules. An artefactual field experiment employs non-standard 
subjects in the laboratory. A framed field experiment is conducted with field 
context in the commodity, the task, or the information set that the subjects can 
use. A natural field experiment take place in.the field with the subjects unaware 
that they are in an experiment. A natural field experiment generates data that 
is closest to naturally-occurring data, and therefore exhibits the highest degree 
of external validity. 
In this thesis, we analyze the generalizability of lab results to real-world 
situations by comparing a lab experiment conducted in Montreal (Canada) to 
a natural field experiment conducted in Ouagadougou (Burkina FasO).6 The 
main difference between the lab and the field is that subjects in the field are 
not aware they are taking part in an experiment. Such a difference is impor-
tant as subjects in the lab, knowing their decisions will be scrutinized by the 
experimenter, may alter their behavior. As further explained subsequently, this 
Ilumeric effort (e.g. van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden 2001, Dickinson and Villeval 
2007). 
(jOur subject pool is standard both in the lab and in the field. As a result, it may 
be argued that the field experill1ent do es Ilot fit exactly under Harrison and List (2004)'s 
definition of a natural field experill1ent. Likewise, although the lab experill1ent is frall1ed and 
uses real-effort, it may Ilot qualify as a frall1ed field experiment. 
4 
thesis also contributes to the literature on work incentives and on corruption .. 
There are three chapters in this thesis. 
In chapter 1,' we describe the experimental design. This design models 
a work environment in which graders are recruited to grade 20 exam papers 
pertaining to candidates. The papers are numbered and ranked from 01 to 20, 
and graders are required to grade the papers following this precise order. In 
sorne of the experimental sessions, exam paper 11 came with a bribe offer. We 
therefore reproduce a corruption scenario in which a candidate offers a bribe to 
a grader in order to obtain a better grade. As a result, we obtain two different 
experiments. The first experiment analyzes the effects of different incentive 
schemes on work effort by focusing on the 10 first papers graded in the lab 
and in the field (see chapter 2). The second experiment relates to corruption 
and analyzes the graders' decision to accept or reject the bribe, as well as the 
grading of papers Il to 20 (see chapter 3). In both experiments, we compare the 
experimental results from the lab and the field to see whether i) the treatment 
effects in the lab and in the field are the same, ii) the directions of treatment 
effects are the same, but the magnitudes differ, or iii) the treatment effects in 
the lab and in the field are different. 
Chapter 2 analyzes work incentives. It extends the experimental study 
of the crowding-out effects of monitoring to a mission-oriented work context, 
as opposed to profit-oriented. Mission-oriented organizations typically include 
public and not-for-profit organizations. Different treatments are conducted 
by varying i) the level of monitoring and punishment, and ii) the wage paid 
to graders (gift-exchange). In the lab, the results indicate that women and 
younger subjects are more precise in their grading. We find that monitor-
5 
ing significantly increases the graders' effort relative to the Control treatment. 
However, increasing monitoring rate and penalties does not raise effort level 
further. In addition, while monitoring increases effort level, the effects appear 
to weaken over time. Gift-exchange is found to have no effect on effort. To test 
their robustness, the results obtained in the lab in Montreal are compared to 
those obtained in the field in Ouagadougou. The direction and the magnitude 
of aIl treatment effects are fully consistent between the two environments. 
In Chapter 3, we make an attempt at testing the external validity of corrup-
tion experiments. To this end, we moved from the lab in a developed country, 
to where corruption arguably matters the most, the field in a developing coun-
try. We conducted four different treatments, each in the lab in Montreal and 
in the field in Ouagadougou, by manipulating i) the wage paid to graders, ii) 
the level of monitoring and punishment, and iii) the amount of the bribe. We 
find that increasing the wage paid to graders lowers their probability of ac-
cepting the bribe, but graders who accept the bribe are more likely to help 
the briber. Monitoring and possible sanctions appear to have no significant 
effect on the graders' decision to accept the bribe or to help the briber. The 
direction and the magnitude of these two treatment effects are similar between 
the lab and the field. However, increasing the amount of the bribe exacerbates 
corruption in the field, while it has no effect in the labo Likewise, when the 
bribe is increased, accepters in the field are more likely to reciprocate by pro-
viding a passing grade to the briber, while no such behavior is observed in the 
labo Overall, our results are encouraging as they suggest that lab behavior may 
generalize to real world situations. 
Chapitre 1 
Experimental design 
7 
1.1 Introduction 
The generalizability of lab results to real world situations is an important is-
sue in experimental economics. 1 However, few experimental studies explicitly 
analyze the generalizability of lab behavior to field situations. To do so, these 
studies typically compare experiments of different types but with similar de-
sign.2 For instance, Brookshire, Coursey and Schulze (1987) compare demand 
behavior for a private good in a real-world market setting and in a Vickrey-
auction lab setting. Likewise, Rondeau and List (2008) contrast the relative 
efficacy of challenge and matching gifts in fund-raising using explicitly linked 
lab and natural field experiments.3 
Following the approach outlined in the previous paragraph, this thesis com-
pares a lab experiment conducted in Montreal (Canada) with a field experiment 
conducted in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). The experimental design models 
a work environ ment in which graders are recruited to grade 20 exam papers 
pertaining to candidates. The 20 papers are numbered and ranked from 01 to 
20, and graders are required to grade the papers in this precise order. In sorne 
experimental sessions, exam paper 11 cornes with a bribe offer. Consequently, 
we obtain two distinct experiments. The first experiment studies the effects of 
various incentive schemes on work effort by focusing on the grading of papers 
01 to 10. The second experiment is a corruption experiment. It analyzes the 
grader's decision to accept or reject the bribe, as weIl as the grading of papers 
1 According to Levitt and List (2007a): "In order for the laboratory to achieve its full 
potential as an invaluable empirical tool in economics, we need to understand when, and un-
der what circumstances, we can reliably generalize lab results to naturally occurring markets 
that are of illterest to economists." 
2See Harrison and List (2004) for a classification of experiments. 
;IFor more comparisons of lab and field experiments, see e.g. List (2006), Levitt and List 
(2007 a, 2007b). 
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Il to 20. Each of the two experiments and its related experimental treatments 
will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
As noted by Friedman and Sunder (1994, p.11), it is futile to try to replicate 
every aspect of the field in the labo lnstead, one should try to find the simplest 
laboratory environment that incorporates sorne interesting aspects of the field 
environment. Therefore, in explicitly linking and comparing a lab and a field 
experiment, most studies focus on the rules of the experimental game and 
attempt to keep them as similar as possible between the experiments. However, 
the lab and the field experiment typically differ on various dimensions that may 
prevent a direct comparison. -l For example, Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh 
(2009) reproduced the Weakest Link TV show in the lab, for comparison with 
the field counterpart. The lab and the field differed regarding e.g. the tasks 
(questions asked) , the stakes and the subject pool. In consequence, lab and 
field results are compared only through the sign of treatment effects. Likewise, 
Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach and Sadrieh (2008) compare a lab and a natural 
field experiment with different tasks in the lab and the field. As a result, effort 
levels in the lab and in the field could not be compared directly. 
A distinctive aspect of our design is that we can compare the lab and the 
field with regard to both the sign and the magnitude of treatment effects. 
lndeed, by keeping the experimental task identical between the lab and the 
field, dependent variables of interest (e.g. grades) are meaSured identically in 
both environments.5 As a result, we can pool the data and compare the lab and 
the field directly, while controlling for observable differences. In the sections 
~That is, a comparison of both the sign and the magnitude of treatment effects. 
"'Graders in the lab and in the field had to grade the same set of 20 exam papers, in the 
same order, and following the same grading rules. 
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below, we describe the experimental procedures with the candidates, followed 
by the lab and field experiments with graders. Experimental instructions and 
other mate rials are presented in the appendices. 
1.2 Candidates 
Subjects, called "candidates", were recruited to type a text on the computer as 
it was continuously dictated to themY The text, based on a newspaper article 
in French, has 290 words and was fitted on two pages. 7 At the beginning of the 
session, each candidate was assigned to an isolated computer. Instructions were 
then read aloud, followed by questions. We explained carefully what would, 
and what would not constitute a mistake. The subjects were also informed 
that at the end of the dictation, they would not be allowed to spell-check or 
modify their papers in any way. We told the candidates that we would decide 
whether their paper would be spell-checked by an experimenter, or by other 
subjects called "graders". Finally, we explained that a candidate's payment 
would depend in part on the number of mistakes the graders would report. 
The lower the number of mistakes reported, the higher the payment. 
Each candidate was also asked whether he would be willing to send sorne 
of the graders a money offer (explicitly referred to as "a bribe"), accompanied 
by the following message: "Please, find few mistakes in my exam paper". We 
(iSuch a dictation exercise is a classic test in the Francophone schooling system. It is 
typically conducted with pen and paper. The aim is to evaluate a candidate's spelling 
abilities, as weil as its knowledge of the French granuuar. Such a test is administered several 
times a year to French students between the ages of 8 and 14. In addition, it is one of the 
requirements to obtain a secretary's diploma, and it is part of the entry-exam to certain civil 
servant positions. The pages on which a candidate typed the dictated text are referred to as 
ml "exam paper" or sim ply a "paper". 
7 As the field experiment was conducted in -a Francophone country, we only recruited 
French speaking subjects to conduct the different laboratory and field sessions. 
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explain to the candidates that if they accepted to do so, then their payoffs may 
not depend exclusively on the number of mistakes reported. Instead, they may 
also be affected positively or negatively by each grader's decision to accept 
or reject the bribe. FinaIly, the candidates were informed that even if they 
accepted to do so, we would not necessarily send the message and the bribe to 
the graders.8 
We deliberately left the candidates' instructions partly ambiguous. In par-
ticular, we did not explain how we would select the papers to be graded by 
experimental subjects. Likewise, we did not specify the precise way in which 
the candidates' payoffs would be calculated. We also remained ambiguous 
about the amount of the bribe that would be proposed to the graders, as weIl 
as the exact consequences on the candidate's payoff when a grader accepts or 
rejects the bribe. The candidates were only informed that they would receive 
three payments: 20 C$ payable immediately after the conclusion of the typ-
ing session, and two additional amounts to be paid respectively three and six 
months later. This delay allowed us to complete the various grading sessions, 
both in the lab and in the field. The candidates were told that each of the 
additional amounts cou Id vary between 20 C$ and 60 C$ depending on the 
number of mistakes reported, and possibly, on the graders' decisions to accept 
or reject the bribe. 
We conducted two typing sessions at the ClRANO's Bell Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics located in Montreal. Each session lasted roughly an 
hour, and included respectively 11 and 12 subjects. AlI 23 subjects accepted 
to send a bribe to the graders. On average, the candidates received a total 
Klnuuediately after reading the instructions, subjects were given the possibility to leave 
the laboratory with 10 C$ without having to type the text. None elected to do so. 
11 
payment of 70.39 C$, with a maximum of 121.44 C$ and a minimum of 60 C$. 
We now describe how we constructed the set of 20 exam papers to be 
graded by the other experimental subjects. In order to control the distribution 
of mistakes, we only selected 7 out of the candidates' 23 papersY Out of these 
7 papers, we chose a "bribe paper" with 20 mistakes. To complete the set of 
20 exam papers, we made up 13 papers with various numbers of mistakes. As 
the papers would be graded in a specifie order, we ordered the set of 20 exam 
papers in a precise way. First, we decided to place the bribe paper in the Il th 
position. Second, we arranged so that the first and last set of 10 papers each 
has a symmetric and roughly identical distribution of mistakes. In part icular , 
they have the same average (15.5), the same median (15.5), and roughly the 
same standard deviation (6.8 versus 6.7). Third, we decided on a passing grade 
of 15 mistakes, meaning that if all mistakes were detected and reported, then 
half the papers would fai1. 10 FinaIly, the exam papers were only identified by 
a lO-character code combining digits and letters. The first two digits, going 
from 01 to 20, identified the order in which the graders were asked to grade the 
papers. For the lab sessions, we only gave the graders the two pages of text. 
For the field sessions, we added a front page so as to look like a legitimate 
exam. This front page included in particular the identification code, as weIl as 
the instructions given to the candidates. 
!) We eliminated the papers with too many skipped words and too many mistakes. The se-
lection process was made purely on the ground of convenience (i.e. to generate an appropriate 
distribution of mistakes). 
lOSuch a failure rate is common in most exams and admission tests in Francophone coun-
tries. 
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1.3 Lab Graders (Montreal, Canada) 
The grading sessions were conducted at CIRANO's Lab in Montreal (Canada). 
Subjects had to grade the set of 20 papers in a precise order. The graders were 
provided with an isolated work station, a pen, a report sheet, and an answer 
book. The sessions had no time limit, and the graders could leave the lab once 
their task completed. 
Graders in the lab were provided with the following information. First, 
they knew from the start that they were taking part in an experiment. The 
corruption nature of the experiment, however, was not revealed immediately. 
Subjects were told at the beginning of the session that they had to grade 20 
papers, and that they will receive additional information during the experimen-
tal session. Second, the lab graders were informed that sorne papers had been 
typed by real subjects, named "candidates", while others had been made up 
by the experimenters. The exact ratio of real candidates was not specified, and 
the graders were informed that nothing would enable them to identify whether 
, 
a paper had been typed by a real candidate or an experimenter. Third, we 
partially explained to the lab graders how the number of mistakes they report 
for a paper affects the candidates' payoffs. N amely, if a grader reports more 
than 15 mistakes, then the paper is not remunerated. In such cases, we asked 
. the graders to check a "Fail" column on the report sheet next to the number of 
mistakes. If the number of reported mistakes is 15 or less, then the payoff de-
pends on the number of mistakes. The lower the number of mistakes reported, 
the higher the remuneration for the candidate. 
The 20 papers were divided in two packs of 10. After completing the first 
pack, the graders were given the remaining 10 papers, with additional written 
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instructions to be read privately. These instructions stated that paper Il had 
been typed by a real candidate, and that this candidate had accepted to send 
a message and a money offer to the grader. The instructions then revealed to 
the grader the exact message and the offer. The graders were free to accept or 
reject the offer, and the consequences of each decision were explained. If the 
offer was accepted, then the amount was credited to the grader and debited 
from the candidate. The grader was then free to decide on the number of 
mistakes to report on the candidate's paper. The graders knew that paper 11 
would be remunerated like any other paper, Le. according to the number of 
mistakes reported. If the offer was rejected, then paper Il was not remunerated. 
Nevertheless, we instructed the subjects to grade paper 11, as weIl as the 
9 remaining papers. At the end of the session, subjects had to fill a short 
questionnaire after which they were paid in cash in Canadian Dollars. 
1.4 Field Graders (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso) 
The field experiment took place in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). Burkina Faso 
is a landlocked country in West Africa with over 13 million inhabitants, among 
which 1.4 million live in the capital city Ouagadougou. A former French colony, 
the country became independent in 1960. Burkina Faso has been categorized 
by the World Bank as a low income country. In 2007, its real per capita income 
was 430 US$, compared to an average of 578 US$ for low income countries, and 
952 US$ for Sub-Saharan African countries. Formerly called the "Republic of 
Upper Volta", it was renamed "Burkina Faso" on August 4, 1984, which may 
be translated into the "Land of Incorruptible People". In 2008, Thansparency 
International ranked Burkina Faso the 80th (out of 180) most corrupt country 
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in the world. AH sect ors of the economy seem to be affected by corruption. 
In particular, the educational sector was ranked as the 7th (out of 10) most 
corrupt public sector in the country in 2006,u 
To hire graders, we used the service of a local recruiting firm (Opty-RH). 
Flyers placed around Ouagadougou proposed a part-time job consisting in grad-
ing exam papers. The offer stated that the job consisted of two sessions: a 
grading session lasting half a day, followed a week later by a debriefing ses-
sion during which graders would be paid. Having a high school diploma and a 
form of identification were the only documentation required. Interested people 
were asked to come register in person at therecruiting firm location. Upon 
registering, graders were given the day, the time, and the location of their two 
sessions. The field subjects were unaware they were about to participate in an 
experiinent. 
The grading sessions took place in a high school located in the center of 
Ouagadougou. Upon arrivai, the subjects were gathered in a large room. In-
structions on how to grade the exam papers were read aloud, foHowed by ques-
tions. Each grader was then randomly assigned to a private room where he 
found an envelope containing the 20 exam papers properly ordered as in the 
lab, a report sheet, a red pen, and an answer book (Le. a copy of the text 
without mistake). No information was given to the graders about the nature 
of the exam, or the candidates. The graders were explicitly instructed to grade 
the papers in the proper order. After spell-checking a paper, the graders had 
to report the number of mistakes both on the front page of the paper, and on 
11 For additional information on the extent of corruption in Bmkina Faso, see the "État de 
la Corruption au Burkina Faso, Rapport 2006" published by the Réseau National de Lutte 
Anti-Corruption. 
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the report sheet. Graders were made aware that a candidate would fail the 
exam when more than 15 mistakes are reported. In such cases, we asked the 
graders to check the "Fail" column on the report sheet next to the number 
of mistakes. The graders were also instructed not to leave their room under 
any circumstance until they were done grading the 20 papers. We told them 
that we would stop by their room every 15 minutes to answer any potenÜal 
question. Grading therefore took place behind closed doors, and the graders 
knew they would be undisturbed except at regular 15 minute intervals. Once 
their task completed, we gave the graders an "IOU", and reminded them to 
come back the following week for the debriefing and payment session. 
To introduce the bribe, we wrote the candidate's message on an easily re-
movable "post-it", and we taped a banknote with it on the second page of 
paper 11. We made sure that the message and the money were i) attached 
securely, ii) not visible unless the exam paper was opened to the second page, 
and iii) discovered before the grader started spell-checking the paperP When 
a grader reported the bribe attempt during one of our visits, we asked him 
to write in bold on the paper "fraud attempt". We then took the banknote 
and the message, and instructed the grader to spell-check the bribe paper just 
like any other paper. Note that the instructions given to the graders at the 
beginning of the session specified that any attempt at fraud by a candidate 
would be penalized by failure of the exam. This information was also available 
in bold on the front page of each paper. 
In the de briefing sessions, field graders were first informed that they took 
l2 Recall that in the field, an exam paper consists of three pages: a front page, plus two 
pages of text. The bribe and the message were attached to the first page of text. Pictures of 
the exam paper with the bribe, as weil as pictures of the high-school where the experiment 
took place are available on the author's webpage at www.amaboly.com. 
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part in an experiment. The nature of the experiment was explained, and infor-
mation was provided about the objective of the research and the use of the data 
collected. In particular, we explained that the data would be fully anonymized, 
and that whatever decisions a subject made during the grading session would 
be without consequence. After answering aIl the graders' questions, we asked 
each subject whether he or she would accept to sign an ex-post consent form 
giving us the right to use the data we collected on him or her. We informed the 
subjects that they did not have to sign the consent form, in which case their 
data would be destroyed. They also knew that refusing to sign the consent 
form was without consequence on their payment. AlI subjects, in aIl of the 
treatments conducted in the field accepted to sign the ex-post consent form. 
Finally, the subjects filled a short questionnaire, after which they were paid in 
cash in return for the "IOU". 
1.5 Conclusion 
This chapter reports on a real-effort experimental design implemented both 
in the lab and in the field. As a result, we can compare the lab and the 
field in order to better understand the generalizability of lab results to real 
world situations. Relative to the lab experiment, subjects in the field are not 
aware they are taking part in an experiment. The design can be divided into 
two distinct experiments, to study work incentives and corrupt behavior. The 
experiment on work incentives is presented in Chapter 2, while the experiment 
on corruption is analyzed in Chapter 3. 
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Annexes 
A.1 Instructions pour les candidats 
Vous allez participer à une expérience économique. Il y a deux types de par-
ticipants à cette expérience: nous appellerons le premier type "candidat" et le 
second type "correcteur". Seuls les candidats participent à la présente session. 
Vous êtes donc un candidat. 
1. Tâche 
Si vous acceptez de participer à cette expérience, nous vous dicterons un 
texte en français que vous devrez écrire en vous servant de l'ordinateur. La 
dictée comprend 366 mots et durera environ 20 minutes. Aucun temps ne sera 
alloué pour corriger vos erreurs à la fin de la dictée. 
Les dictées seront ensuite corrigées par des correcteurs. Les correcteurs 
seront soit des expérimentateurs, soit différents groupes de participants qui 
seront recrutés pour deux séries de sessions expérimentales de correction. La 
première série se terminera au plus tard le 15 juin 2007 et la seconde série 
au plus tard le 15 septembre 2007. Comme nous allons vous l'expliquer dans 
quelques instants, votre rémunération dépendra principalement du nombre de 
fautes reportées par les correcteurs. 
II. Critères de correction 
Toutes les copies seront corrigées de la façon suivante : 
1. La présentation (mise en page, retour à la ligne, saut de ligne) ne 
sera pas prise en compte. 
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2. Seules la précision dactylographique et l'orthographe seront évaluées. 
Sera compté comme une (1) faute: 
• Un mot, une lettre ou une ponctuation (point, virgule ... ) qui manque. 
• Une faute d'orthographe ou de saisie (y compris les accents, tirets ... ). 
• Une minuscule ou une majuscule incorrectement placée dans le texte. 
Par exemple, une minuscule en début de phrase comptera pour une faute. 
D'autre part : 
• Un mot comportant plusieurs erreurs compte pour une seule faute. 
Par exemple " shantter" au lieu de "chanter" comptera pour une seule faute. 
• Une même erreur, faite plusieurs fois sur le même mot, compte pour 
une seule faute. Par exemple, "chant ter" comptera pour une seule faute si écrit 
exactement de cette façon plusieurs fois dans le texte. 
• Les nombres doivent être écrits en lettres sauf les années qui doivent 
être en chiffres. 
Notez qu'il est possible que le texte soumis aux correcteurs soit abrégé. 
Dans ce cas, nous retirerions exactement les mêmes paragraphes pour tous les 
candidats. 
III. Objectif de l'expérience 
L'étude à laquelle vous participez fait partie d'un projet de recherche plus 
général visant à mieux comprendre les problèmes de corruption. Dans la 
présente expérience, nous souhaitons étudier le comportement des correcteurs 
lorsqu'un pot-de-vin leur est proposé. 
Par conséquent, si vous acceptez de participer à l'expérience, il se peut 
que nous proposions en votre nom (mais de façon confidentielle) un montant 
d'argent (c'est-à-dire un pot-de-vin) aux correcteurs en leur demandant de trou-
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ver peu de fautes dans votre copie. Dans ce cas, votre rémunération dépendra 
du nombre de fautes reportées par les correcteurs et de leur décision d'accepter 
ou non le montant d'argent. 
IV. Rémunération 
Si vous acceptez de participer à l'expérience, vous obtiendrez une compen-
sation de 10 C$ pour être arrivé à l'heure, ainsi qu'une rémunération de 10 C$ 
pour avoir dactylographié la dictée. Ce montant de 20 C$ vous sera payé en 
argent comptant à la fin de la séance expérimentale. 
De plus, vous recevrez deux paiements supplémentaires. Le premier paiement 
vous sera versé le 15 juin 2007 après la première série de sessions expérimen-
tales de correction. Le second paiement vous sera versé le 15 septembre 2007 
après la seconde série de sessions expérimentales. 
Chacun des deux paiements peut varier entre 20 C$ au minimum et 60 C$ 
au maximum. Nous ne pouvons pas vous préciser le montant exact de chacun 
de ces deux paiements car ils dépendront du travail des correcteurs, et possi-
blement de leurs décisions d'accepter ou non le montant que nous pourrions 
proposer en votre nom. Cependant, en règle générale, moins vous ferez de 
fautes dans la dictée, plus votre rémunération sera élevée. 
Si vous préférez ne pas participer à l'expérience, vous n'avez pas à accomplir 
la tâche demandée. Par contre, vous n'obtiendrez pour seul paiement que la 
compensation de 10 C$ pour être arrivé à l'heure. Ce montant vous sera payé, 
en argent comptant une fois que nous aurons fini de lire les instructions. Vous 
serez alors li bre de partir. 
V. Conditions de participation 
En résumé, si vous acceptez de participer à l'expérience, vous acceptez: 
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• De dactylographier le texte de la dictée. 
• Que la longueur de la dictée soit modifiée par les expérimentateurs au 
besoin. 
• Que nous proposions en votre nom (mais de façon confidentielle) un 
montant d'argent aux correcteurs en leur demandant de trouver peu de fautes 
dans votre copie. 
• De recevoir un paiement de 20 C$ aujourd'hui. 
• De recevoir deux autres paiements compris entre 20 C$ et 60 C$, le 
15 juin 2007 pour le premier paiement et le 15 septembre 2007 pour le second 
paiement. 
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A.2 Instructions pour les correcteurs (Laboratoire) 
Vous allez participer à une expérience économique. Il y a deux types de par-
ticipants à cette expérience: nous appellerons le premier type "candidat" et le 
second type "correcteur". Seuls les correcteurs participent à la présente session. 
Vous êtes donc un correcteur. 
Au cours de l'expérience, les gains seront mesurés en Unités Monétaires 
Expérimentales (UME). A la fin de l'expérience, le montant en UME sera 
converti en $ canadiens. Le taux de change pour les correcteurs est de 12 UME 
= 1 C$. A cette somme, nous ajouterons 10 C$ pour être arrivé à l'heure à 
la présente session. Vous serez payé dès la fin de l'expérience, à l'extérieur du 
laboratoire, en privé et en argent comptant. 
1. Tâche 
Votre tâche consiste à corriger 2 lots de 10 copies, en suivant les instructions 
que nous vous donnerons. Une copie est un texte en français comportant des 
fautes d'orthographe ou de frappe. Une partie des copies a été dactylographiée 
par de vrais candidats, l'autre partie par les expérimentateurs. Cependant, rien 
(ni l'ordre, ni le nombre de fautes, ni le type de fautes) ne peut vous permettre 
d'identifier si une copie a été dactylographiée par un vrai candidat ou par un 
expérimentateur . 
La rémunération des candidats dépendra du nombre de fautes que vous 
reporterez. Pour les copies avec 15 fautes ou moins, plus le nombre de fautes 
reportées est petit, plus la rémunération du candidat sera grande. Par contre, 
les copies comportant plus de 15 fautes ne seront pas rémunérées. La qualité 
de votre travail de correction est donc très importante car elle peut affecter 
fortement la rémunération que les candidats recevront. 
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Après avoir corrigé chaque copie, veuillez additionner et écrire le nombre de 
fautes sur la première page de cette copie. Nous vous donnerons aussi une "liste 
de report des fautes" sur laquelle vous devrez reporter le nombre de fautes de 
chaque copie en face du code d'identification correspondant. Si la copie com-
porte plus de 15 fautes, veuillez également cocher la colonne "Échec". Enfin, à 
la fin de l'expérience, nous vous demanderons de remplir un questionnaire. 
Vous devez commencer la correction par le lot 1. Une fois la correction du 
lot 1 terminée, veuillez lever la main. Nous vous remettrons alors le lot 2 ainsi 
que des informations complémentaires sur le déroulement de la session. Le 
temps nécessaire pour la correction de chaque lot de 10 copies est estimé à 40 
minutes. L'expérience ne devrait donc pas durer plus de 2 heures. Cependant, 
si vous n'avez pas terminé la correction des lots 1 et 2 au bout des deux heures, 
vous devrez rester pour terminer votre travail de correction. Dans les lignes 
suivantes, nous allons vous indiquer comment effectuer la correction des copies. 
Veuillez suivre ces consignes très précisément lors de votre travail de correction. 
II. Critères de correction 
1. Un solutionnaire est remis à chaque correcteur. Ce solutionnaire ne 
comporte aucune faute et doit servir de référence pour corriger les copies. 
2. La présentation (mise en page, retour à la ligne, saut de ligne) ne 
sera pas prise en compte. Vous devez seulement évaluer la précision dactylo-
graphique et l'orthographe dans chaque copie. 
3. Sur chaque copie, veuillez souligner ou entourer les fautes que vous 
trouvez. 
Sera compté comme une (1) faute: 
• Un mot, une lettre ou une ponctuation (point, virgule ... ) en plus ou 
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en moins. 
• Une faute d'orthographe ou de saisie (y compris les accents, tirets ... ). 
• Une minuscule ou une majuscule incorrectement placée dans le texte. 
Par exemple, une minuscule en début de phrase comptera pour une faute. 
D'autre part: 
• Un mot comportant plusieurs erreurs compte pour une seule faute. 
Par exemple "shantter" au lieu de "chanter" comptera pour une seule faute. 
• Un mot composé sera considéré comme un seul mot. Par exemple, 
"après-midi" sera considéré comme un seul mot. 
• Une même erreur, faite plusieurs fois sur le même mot, compte pour 
une seule faute. Par exemple, "chantter" comptera pour une seule faute si écrit 
exactement de cette façon plusieurs fois dans le texte. 
• Les espaces entre deux mots (par exemple, "Les __ instructions") ou 
entre un mot et une ponctuation (par exemple, "Instructions 
pas considérés comme des fautes. 
") ne sont 
• Les nombres doivent être écrits en lettres sauf les années qui doivent 
être en chiffres. 
• Les copies doivent être corrigées exactement dans l'ordre dans lequel 
vous les recevez. 
, III. Rémunération et contrôle du travail de correction 
La rémunération est de 250 UME pour la correction des lots 1 et 2, soit 12.5 
UME par copie. Cependant, les erreurs de correction (une faute non trouvée 
ou une faute qui n'en est pas une) peuvent entraîner une pénalité monétaire 
qui sera soustraite des 250 UME. 
Nous contrôlerons votre travail afin de déterminer si vous devez être pénal-
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isé. Le contrôle s'effectuera de la façon suivante. Vous tirerez au hasard 5 jetons 
\ 
d'un sac contenant des jetons numérotés de 1 à 20. Chaque numéro correspond 
à une copie différente. Pour chacune des copies tirées, nous calculerons la dif-
férence entre le nombre de fautes que vous avez inscrit sur la "liste de report 
des fautes" et le nombre de fautes effectivement présentes sur la copie. Nous ne 
prendrons en compte que la copie la plus mal corrigée, c'est-à-dire celle pour 
laquelle la différence calculée est la plus grande. 
Le tableau ci-dessous donne le montant de la pénalité en fonction de cette 
différence maximale: 
Si la différence maximale est: Penalité (en UME): 
entre 0 et 2 fautes 0 
entre 3 et 5 fautes 100 
entre 6 et 9 fautes 150 
de 10 fautes ou plus 225 
Par exemple, si pour les copies tirées au hasard, la différence maximale 
entre le nombre de fautes reporté sur la "liste de report des fautes" et le nom-
bre de fautes effectif est 7, la pénalité sera de 150 UME. Dans ce cas, votre 
rémunération sera: 250 - 150 = 100 UME. 
Si vous avez des questions ou problèmes pendant le travail de correction, 
veuillez nous appeler en silence en levant la main. Par contre, toute communica-
tion entre participants est interdite pendant l'expérience. Si vous ne respectez 
pas ces consignes, nous serons obligés de vous exclure de l'expérience, sans 
aucun paiement. 
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A.3 Instructions pour les correcteurs (Suite, Labora-
toire) 
Les informations ci-dessous sont privées. Veuillez les lire en silence 
et ne pas les commuriiquer â d'autres participants. Si vous avez des 
questions, merci de lever la main. Nous viendrons répondre en privé 
â vos questions. 
La copie 11 V250683G que vous allez corriger a été dactylographiée par un 
vrai candidat, pas par un expérimentateur. Ce candidat a accepté de vous 
envoyer un message accompagné d'un montant d'argent. 
Le message est le suivant: "S'il vous plait, veuillez trouver peu de fautes 
dans ma dictée". Le montant qui vous est proposé est de 50 UME. 
Vous devez décider d'accepter ou non ce montant: 
- Si vous acceptez le montant proposé, la copie du candidat sera rémunérée 
normalement, c'est-à-dire en fonction du nombre de fautes que vous reporterez. 
D'autre part, le montant de 50 UME sera soustrait des gains du candidat et 
ajouté à vos gains, et ce quelque soit le nombre de fautes que vous reporterez. 
En particulier, si vous acceptez le montant et que vous reportez plus de 15 
fautes, le candidat ne recevra aucune rémunération pour sa copie (puisqu'il 
aura échoué), mais nous lui retirerons quand même les 50 UME qui vous seront 
transférés. 
- Si vous refusez le montant proposé, la copie du candidat ne sera pas 
rémunérée. 
Quelque soit votre décision d'accepter ou de rejeter le montant proposé, 
vous devez corriger la copie du candidat. Cependant, vous êtes libre d'inscrire 
le nombre de fautes que vous souhaitez sur sa copie. Comme pour toutes les 
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autres copies, le même nombre de fautes devra être inscrit sur la copie et sur 
la "liste de report des fautes" . 
Après avoir corrigé la copie 11, veuillez nous indiquer la décision que vous 
avez prise en cochant l'une des cases sur la "feuille de décision" qui vous a été 
remise. 
Notez bien qu'au moment de contrôler votre travail, nous ne disposerons 
que de votre "liste de report des fautes". Nous ne saurons donc pas si vous 
avez accepté ou non le montant proposé par le candidat. Ce n'est qu'après 
avoir contrôlé votre travail que vous nous remettrez votre "feuille de décision". 
Nous pourrons alors calculer votre rémunération totale. 
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A.4 Feuille de décision (Laboratoire) 
Numéro de table: xx 
Afin de nous indiquer votre décision, veuillez cocher l'une des cases ci-
dessous au moment qui vous conviendra le mieux: 
D "Je refuse le montant" 
D "J'accepte le montant" 
Merci pour votre collaboration !!! 
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A.5 Instructions pour les correcteurs (Terrain) 
1. Conditions et critères de correction 
1. Un solutionnaire vous sera remis. Ce solutionnaire ne comporte au-
cune faute et doit servir de référence pour corriger les copies. 
2. Sur la première page de chaque copie, vous trouverez les instructions 
qui ont été données aux candidats. Veuillez lire attentivement ces instructions 
afin de bien comprendre ce qui constitue une faute. 
3. Vous devez apposer vos initiales et votre signature sur la première 
page de chaque copie corrigée. 
4. Les copies doivent être corrigées exactement dans l'ordre dans lequel 
vous les recevez. 
5. La correction doit se faire sans pause ou sortie de la salle. 
6. Nous vous rendrons régulièrement visite (environ toutes les 15 minutes). 
Au cours de ces visites, vous pourrez nous poser des questions ou reporter tout 
problème lié à la correction. En aucun cas, vous ne devez sortir de votre salle 
avant d'avoir terminé votre travail de correction. 
7. La durée estimée du travail de correction est d'environ 3 heures. 
II. Instructions pour le report des fautes 
1. Vous trouverez dans votre salle de classe une "liste de report des 
fautes" qui comporte les codes d'identification des candidats ainsi qu'une colonne 
"Échec" . 
2. Veuillez inscrire votre nom, prénom et signature aux endroits indiqués 
sur cette "liste de report des fautes". 
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3. Les copies qui vous seront remises sont anonymes et ne comportent 
qu'un numéro d'identification. 
4. Après avoir corrigé chaque copie, veuillez additionner et écrire le nom-
bre de fautes sur la première page de cette copie. Vous devez reporter le nombre 
de fautes de chaque copie en face du code d'identification correspondant. Si une 
copie comporte plus de 15 fautes, veuillez également cocher la colonne "Échec" . 
III. Rémunération et contrôle du travail de correction 
. 1. Le taux de rémunération est de 5000 FCFA pour 20 copies, soit 250 
FCFA par copie. Cependant, les erreurs de correction (une faute non trouvée 
ou une faute qui n'en est pas une) peuvent entraîner une pénalité monétaire 
qui sera soustraite des 5000 FCFA. Nous contrôlerons donc votre travail afin 
de déterminer si vous devez être pénalisé. Le contrôle s'effectuera de la façon 
suivante. Nous tirerons au hasard 5 de vos copies. Pour chaque copie, nous 
calculerons la différence entre le nombre de fautes que vous avez inscrit sur la 
"liste de report des fautes" et le nombre de fautes effectivement présentes sur 
la copie. Nous ne prendrons en compte que la copie la plus mal corrigée, c'est-
à-dire celle pour laquelle la différence calculée est la plus grande. Le tableau 
ci-dessous donne le montant de la pénalité en fonction de cette différence max-
imale: 
Si la différence maximale est: Penalité (en FCFA): 
entre 0 et 2 fautes 0 
entre 3 et 5 fautes 2000 
entre 6 et 9 fautes 3000 
de 10 fautes ou plus 4500 
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Par exemple, si pour les copies tirées au hasard, la différence maximale entre 
le nombre de fautes reporté sur la "liste de report des fautes" et le nombre 
de fautes effectif est 7, la pénalité sera de 3000 FCFA. Dans ce cas, votre 
rémunération sera: 5000 - 3000= 2000 FCFA. 
2. Une fois la correction terminée, veuillez sortir en silence et venir nous 
voir dans la présente salle. Nous vous prions de bien vouloir laisser le matériel 
de correction ainsi que les copies dans votre salle de classe. 
3. Une reconnaissance de dette vous sera remise. Cette reconnaissance 
de dette comportera le nom et l'adresse de l'émetteur, ainsi que la date à 
laquelle vous serez payés. 
4. Il est très important que vous arriviez à l'heure indiquée sous peine 
de ne pas être payé. 
Bon travail !!! 
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A.6 Copie d'examen sur le terrain (première page) 
BURKINA FASO 
Date: 
Code d'identification: 
OlB080582Y 
ÉPREUVE DE DICTÉE AVEC PRISE DACTYLOGRAPHIQUE 
Instructions aux candidat(e)s 
Seules la précision dactylographique et l'orthographe seront évaluées. La 
présentation (mise en page, retour à la ligne, saut de ligne) ne sera pas prise 
en compte. Sera compté comme une (1) faute: 
• Un mot, une lettre ou une ponctuation (point, virgule ... ) en plus ou 
en moins. 
• Une faute d'orthographe ou de saisie (y compris les accents, tirets ... ). 
• Une minuscule ou une majuscule incorrectement placée dans le texte. 
Par exemple, une minuscule en début de phrase comptera pour une faute. 
D'autre part: 
• Un mot comportant plusieurs erreurs compte pour une seule faute. 
Par exemple" shantter" au lieu de "chanter" comptera pour une seule faute. 
• Un mot composé sera considéré comme un seul mot. Par exemple, 
"après-midi" sera considéré comme un seul mot. 
• Une même erreur, faite plusieurs fois sur le même mot, compte pour 
une seule faute. Par exemple, "chantter" comptera pour une seule faute si écrit 
exactement de cette façon plusieurs fois dans le texte. 
• Les espaces entre deux mots (par exemple, "Les __ instructions") ou 
entre un mot et une ponctuation (par exemple, "Instructions __ : ") ne sont 
pas considérés comme des fautes. 
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• Les nombres doivent être écrits en lettres sauf les années qui doivent 
être en chiffres. 
N.B. : Toute fraude ou tentative de fraude entrainera un échec 
immédiat. 
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A.7 Texte de la dictée (Corrigé) 
Titre: Anticiper la fin du pétrole 
On estime à plusieurs milliers de milliards de barils les réserves de pét-
role prouvées, soit cent cinquante milliards de tonnes environ. Elles sont très 
inégalement réparties: près des deux tiers sont situées au Proche-Orient. 
Leur évolution ne permet cependant pas de prévoir celle de la production 
pétrolière, les données relatives aux réserves donnant lieu à de vives controverses 
entre écoles de pensée. 
Les réserves obtenues par des techniques de mise en production modernes 
et par la réévaluation des réserves de gisements anciens coûtent souvent moins 
cher à exploiter que celles obtenues par exploration. D'où la limitation de 
cette activité dans des pays offrant pourtant les meilleures perspectives de 
découvertes. 
Les pessimistes insistent tout d'abord sur le caractère politique des réévalu-
ations de réserves effectuées en 1986 et qui ne correspondent pas à de véritables 
réserves prouvées. 
Pour appuyer leur thèse, ils rappellent que nous disposons enfin d'un accès 
à l'ensemble des données de tous les bassins pétroliers, ainsi que d'un échantil-
lonnage suffisant pour que des méthodologies prédictives des réserves restant à 
découvrir soient désormais raisonnablement fiables. 
Différentes équipes de spécialistes proposent une vision intermédiaire. Les 
réserves ultimes de pétrole conventionnel seraient de l'ordre de trois mille mil-
liards de barils, dont mille environ déjà consommés, un peu plus de mille de 
réserves prouvées, le reste correspondant aux réserves à découvrir. 
On peut considérer qu'il existe un continuum de ressources en hydrocarbu-
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res : gisements plus difficiles d'accès, plus complexes, plus difficiles à détecter. 
Ce continuum n'est pas limité aux hydrocarbures d'origine pétrolière: nom-
breuses sont les recherches sur le développement des techniques de production 
de carburants à partir du gaz naturel ou à partir du charbon. Il s'étend aussi 
aux carburants qui sont issus de la biomasse. 
Auteurs: Denis Babusiaux et Pierre-René Bauquis13 
13Voir: http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2005/01/BABUSIAUX/11803 
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A.8 Distribution des fautes (copies d'examen) 
Rang de la copie Nombre de fautes 
1 15 
2 24 
3 6 
4 25 
5 16 
6 5 
7 20 
8 11 
9 19 
10 14 
11 20 
12 11 
13 12 
14 10 
15 23 
16 16 
17 17 
18 4 
19 27 
20 15 
Chapitre 2 
Monitoring in a mission-oriented 
context 
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2.1 Introduction 
Standard economic models of incentives consider that agents are likely to shirk 
because of effort disutility. In order to induce agents to raise their effort level, 
incentive schemes such as monitoring may be used (see e.g. A1chian and Dem-
setz 1972). However, sorne behavioral models suggest that if perceived as hos-
tile or unfair, monitoring may reduce effort by destroying intrinsic motivation 
(e.g. Frey 1993).1 Therefore, monitoring may have two opposite effects: a 
disciplining and a crowding-out effect. 
Several experimental studies show that monitoring may indeed reduce over-
an effort (see e.g. Fehr and Falk 2002, Fehr and Gachter 2002). Such a result 
may be explained by assuming that agents are heterogenous regarding intrinsic 
motivation. Sorne agents are selfish and dislike work effort, while other agents 
may be intrinsically motivated to work hard.2 For the first type, monitoring 
may be effective in eliciting higher effort (Falk and Kosfeld 2006). For the 
second type however, monitoring may destroy intrinsic motivation, leading to 
a reduction in effort. This reduction may be large enough to induce a lower 
overall effort. Most experiments supporting the crowding-out effect of monitor-
ing use a principal-agent design with two decision stages. First, the principal 
chooses between two incentive schemes, e.g. between monitoring or not mon-
itoring. Then, subject to the chosen incentive scheme, the agent chooses an 
effort level which determines the profit of the principal. As a result, these 
experiments may be thought of aS studying the profit-oriented sector, which 
produces private goods that can be valued monetarily and distributed via mar-
1 Frey and .Jegen (2001) provide a survey of the empirical literature. 
2 "Intrinsic motivation" refers to doing somethillg beCalll:>e it is illherently ÎllterestÎllg or ell-
joyable (Ryan and Oeci 2000), as opposed to "extrinsic motivation" which refers to incentives 
coming from outside the person (Frey 1993). 
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kets. 
This chapter extends the analysis of the incentive effects of monitoring to 
organizations that can be viewed as mission-oriented, as opposed to profit-
oriented. Mission-oriented organizations typically include public and not-for-
profit organizations (see e.g. Wilson 1989, Tirole 1994, Sheehan 1996). These 
organizations are generally involved in promoting general welfare through the 
provision of collective goods such as health, education, or security.3 Note that 
sorne mission-oriented organizations, such as universities or hospitals, may be 
private but with many other objectives than profit-maximization. It is the 
nature of the activities that is important, not whether the service is provided 
publicly or privately (Besley and Ghatak 2003). 
In a mission-oriented setup, one may expect monitoring to have disciplining 
effects when the agent is selfish, as in a profit-oriented setup. However, in 
a mission-oriented work context, two factors may mitigate the crowding-out 
effect of monitoring. First, the success of the mission may be valued by the 
agent more than any monetary income he receives in the pro cess (Besley and 
Ghatak 2005). Therefore, it may be the case that motivated agents work 
as hard with as without monitoring. Second, the agent's effort may mainly 
affects third-parties but not the principal who chooses the incentive scheme.-! 
For example, physicians are committed to saving people's life, policemen to 
protecting citizens, professors to educating students. As a result, motivated 
:1 For instance, Rainey and Steinbauer (1999, p. 23) argue that governnient employees are 
driven by public service motivation, defined as "a general altruistic motivation to serve the 
interests of a conununity of people, a state, a nation, or humankind" . 
1 Some public organizations may get their revenues from taxation, but not through market 
competition. Their existence is typically not at risk when the public official shirks. In 
the profit-oriented sector, the agent's effort may also affect clients (e.g. an employee at a 
McDonald dealing with customers), but more importantly, it determines the principal's level 
of profit. 
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agents may refrain from reducing effort to avoid hurting these third-parties. 
In total, overall effort may therefore be higher with monitoring than without 
monitoring in a mission-oriented setup. 
Our experimental design attempts to create a mission-oriented work envi-
ronment as follows. To begin with, we model a Principal-Agent-Client frame-
work by introducing a third-party (client) besides a principal and an agent (see 
Banfield 1975). Namely, agents (graders) are hired and paid by the principal 
(experimenter) to grade exam papers pertaining to clients (candidates). Next, 
we induce a sense of mission by requiring real-effort from candidates who had 
to type a text dictated to them. The dictated texts provided us with exam 
papers. Then, graders' task consisted in finding spelling mistakes in the exam 
papers. In such a context, the "mission" may consist in providing a fair grading 
of the candidates' work.5 
Two main experimental treatments are conducted in the labo In the Control 
treatment, subjects are paid a fixed amount for their grading, independent of 
how they perform the task. In a second treatment called "Monitoring", we 
introduce a performance-related payment scheme. Specifically, graders are told 
that they may be imposed a monetary penalty depending on the quality of their 
grading. Two secondary treatments are also conducted. In the first secondary 
treatment, we analyze the effects on effort of increasing both the monitoring 
rate and the monetary penalties. In the second one, a gift exchange treatment 
is conducted for comparison with monitoring Y 
'·'Wilson (HI89) defines a mission as a culture that is "broadly shared and warmly en-
clorsed" (p. 109). We believe that principles such as honesty and faimess are shared and 
endorsed by ll10st people in academia. The latter principle upholds that each student should 
be treated equally, in particular when grading their exams. Faimess in grading is likely to 
be salie nt to our experimental subjects as they are mostly studel1ts. 
tiGift exchange in labor markets relates to the fair wage-effort hypothesis (Akerlof 1982), 
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To test the robustness of the results obtained in the lab in Montreal, we 
compared them to those of the field experiment conducted in Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso). Relative to the lab, two aspects of the field experiment are 
noteworthy. First, the field experiment is done unbeknownst to subjects. Sec-
ond, the field experiment is conducted in a developing country, namely Burkina 
Faso. These differences allow to check the generalizability of lab results when 
moving from the lab in a developed country to the field in a developing country. 
ln the lab, we find that monitoring significantly increases the graders' effort 
relative to the Control treatment, indicating that monitoring may be effective 
in raising effort in a mission-oriented setting. However, increasing monitoring 
rate and monetary penalties do es not raise effort level further. Gift-exchange 
is found to have no effect on effort, suggesting that monitoring (a pecuniary 
incentive) may be more effective than gift-exchange (a non-pecuniary incentive) 
in eliciting effort in a mission-oriented setup.7 
The effect of monitoring is found to depend on the grader's intrinsic moti-
vation. Indeed, to separate motivated graders from selfish graders, we use the 
graders' decision to reject a bribe offer as a proxy for adherence to the mission 
of grading exam papers impartially. Graders who rejected the bribe are con-
sidered mot ivated , while those who accepted the bribe are considered selfish. 
The evidence suggests that motivated graders work as hard with as without 
monitoring, while monitoring appears to have a significant disciplining effect on 
selfish graders. The results obtained in the lab are found to be robust. Indeed, 
although the level of effort differs between the lab in Montreal and the field 
which posits that employers paya wage above the market-clearing wage in order for their 
employees to reciprocate by exerting higher effort. 
ïFor another paper that compares pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentive schemes, see 
AI-Ubaydli et al. (2008). 
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in Ouagadougou, we find that the direction and the magnitude of treatment 
effects are fully consistent between the two environments. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The related literature 
is summarized in section 2. Experimental treatments are presented in section 
3. Experimental results are analyzed in section 4 and section 5 concludes. 
2.2 Related Literature 
To the best of our knowledge, no experimental study of the incentive effects 
of monitoring in the mission-oriented sector is available. We therefore simply 
discuss experiments on monitoring in profit-oriented setups. Then, we summa-
rize briefly the experimental literature on the generalizability of lab behavior 
to real world situations. 
In a natural field experiment, Nagin et al. (2002) studied the effects of vary-
ing monitoring rates in 16 caU centers. These authors find results supporting 
the disciplining effect of monitoring. They also show that a significant pro-
portion of employees exhibit intrinsic motivation by not reacting to variations 
of monitoring rates. However, several lab experiments have documented that 
monitoring may in fact reduce effort level. Fehr and Gachter (2002) find that 
the crowding-out effect of imposing a fine to prevent agents from shirking may 
be large enough to make, on average, contracts with monitoring less efficient 
than fixed-price contracts without monitoring. Falk and ,Kosfeld (2006) also 
find that the undermining effect of monitoring may outweigh its disciplining 
effect.8 These experiments suggest that the crowding-out effects of monitoring 
llThe crowding-out effect of monitoring appears to extend to other contexts than the 
labor market. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show that the introduction of a fine for parents 
42 
may outweigh the disciplining effects in a profit-oriented setup. Whether this 
result extends to a mission-oriented sect or is still an open question. 
By comparing a lab and a field experiment, this chapter adds to experimen-
tal studies on the generalizability of lab behavior to real-world situations (see 
e.g. List 2006 on social preferences, Benz and Meier 2008 on donation behav-
ior). We are only aware of one labor market lab experiment with an explicit 
field counterpart. In a gift-exchange experiment, Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach 
and Sadrieh (2008) find similar results between a lab and a natural field ex-
periment, conducted to analyze the effects of own and peer wage variations on 
workers' effort. However, their tasks in the lab and in the field were different, 
not allowing for a direct comparison of effort level and treatment effects. In 
contrast, in our experiment, graders in the lab and in the field had to. grade 
exactly the same set of exam papers and received the same instructions for 
grading the papers. As a result, we can· compare explicitly the direction and 
the magnitude of treatment effects between the lab and the field. 
2.3 Experimental Treatments 
In the following section, we describe the experimental treatments. There are 
four treatments. Each treatment is conducted both in the lab and in the field. 
In the Control treatment, subjects are paid a fixed amount for their grading, 
independent of how they perform the task. In the lab, the fixed amount, called 
a wage hereafter, was 250 Experimental Units (EU hereafter) for 20 exam 
papers or 12.5 EU per paper. The conversion rate in the lab was 1 C$ = 12 
mTiving late to piek up their ehildren at sehool, erowded out intrinsie motivation to do so. 
Monitoring has also been found to llndermine trustworthiness (Fehr and Roekenbaeh 2003), 
or intrinsie motivation for honesty (Sehulze and Frank 2003). 
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EU. In the field, the wage was set at 5,000 FCF A for 20 ex am papers or 250 
FCF A per paperY Note that the lab payoffs are standard while the wage paid 
in the field has been selected so as to be credible and attractive. Indeed, 5,000 
FCF A represents about 1/6 of the monthly minimum wage in Burkina Faso. 
ln the "Monitoring" treatment, we introduced a mechanism aimed at moni-
toring the accuracy with which the graders perform their task. The monitoring 
mechanism was explained as follows. We told each grader that we would ran-
domly pick and control 1 of the 20 papers he graded. Then, we would calculate 
the difference between the number of mistakes reported by the grader and the 
number of mistakes we found in the paper. This difference would then be used 
to determine the penalty to be imposed (see Table 2.1).10 Similarly, in the 
second monitoring treatment called "High Monitoring", we told each grader 
that we would randomly pick and control 5 out of the 20 papers graded. Then, 
we would calculate the difference between the number of mistakes reported by 
the grader and the number of mistakes we found in the papers. Only the worst 
graded paper, i.e. the one with the maximum calculated difference, would be 
considered to determine the monetary penalty (see Table 2.2). Except for the 
risk of being penalized, the monitoring treatments are identical to the Control 
treatment. 
The "Gift Exchange" treatment is also identical to the Control treatment 
except that the wage was 40% higher (i.e. 350 EU in the lab and 7,000 
FC FAin the field). In the field, we implemented gift-exchange by providing 
a direct gift to graders. Specifically, in posters to recruit graders in the field, 
!'The Franc CFA is the currency used in Burkina Faso. In July 2007, the conversion rate 
was roughly 1 C$ for 442.9 FC F A. 
lOvVhile monetary fines are not typically used in the workplace, other more common types 
of "fines" include verbal warnings, demotion'or dismissal (Dickinson 2001). 
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the announced wage was 5,000 FCF A. However, graders were told on the day 
of the experiment that the amount they would receive had been increased to 
7,000 FCF AY In the lab, subjects simply received a higher wage compared 
to the baseline treatment. 
In total, 180 (respectively 248) subjects participated in the four treatments 
conducted in the lab (respectively in the field). More precisely, in the lab 
(field), 62 (82) subjects participated in the Control treatment, 55 (82) in the 
Monitoring treatment, 32 (44) in the High Monitoring treatment, and 31 (40) 
in the Gift Exchange treatment. On average, the total earnings of a lab grader 
(a field grader) were 31 C$ (6,000 FCF A) in the Control treatment, 27.87 C$ 
(5,060.98 FCF A) in the Monitoring treatment, 21.36 C$ (4,545.45 FCF A) 
in the High Monitoring treatment, and 39.25 C$ (8,000 FCF A) in the Gift 
Exchange treatment. 12 
2.4 Experimental Results 
In this study, we concentrate on the 10 first papers graded in the lab and in 
the field. Effort is proxied by the precision of a grader, which is measured as 
the absolu te deviation from the actual number of mistakes in a paper. The 
higher the absolute deviation, the ·lower the grader's precision. In the next 
sections, we use summary statistics and Mann-Whitney tests to analyze the 
data, followed by a regression analysis. 13 We start by the results obtained in the 
II This was similar to the surprise approach used in Gneezy and List (2006). 
12The amounts do not include the bribe. Using the Purchasing Power Conversion ta-
ble from the UN database, we have that e.g. 31 C$ ~ 5580 FC F A, in 2006. See at 
ht tp:lldata.un.org/Data.aspx'?d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%3A699. 
1:IThe reported test statistics are two-sided. Note also that the conclusions of the reported 
Mann-Whitney tests do not differ from those of t-tests (not reported here). 
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lab in Montreal, before turning to those obtained in the field in Ouagadougou.1-J. 
2.4.1 Results from the Lab 
Table 2.3, columns "Lab", provides an overview of the graders' performance in 
the labo The first column gives the rank of papers as graders were asked to grade 
the papers in a specifie order, and the second column gives the actual number 
of mistakes of the relevant pape.r. The following columns show the per paper 
average number of mistakes, reported by treatment and by environment. 15 The 
"Lab" columns show that graders tend to find fewer mistakes than actually 
present in an exam paper. lndeed, for papers 01 to 10, the average number of 
mistakes reported by graders is inferior to the true number of mistakes in aIl 
treatments. 
Summary statistics on average absolute deviation in the lab in Montreal 
are given in Table 2.4, columns "Lab". We find that work monitoring increases 
overall effort. lndeed, relative to the Control treatment, graders' precision 
is significantly higher at the 1% level in the Monitoring treatment (p-value 
= 0.001, Mann-Whitney), and at the 10% level in the High Monitoring treat-
ment (p-value = 0.079, Mann-Whitney). While graders' precision is slightly 
lower in High Monitoring relative to Monitoring, the difference between these 
treatments is not significant (p-value = 0.432, Mann-Whitney). Finally, giving 
a higher wage to graders has no significant effect on work effort compared to 
the Control treatment (p-value = 0.616, Mann-Whitney). 
We now turn to a regression analysis to study treatment effects while con-
L ~Data is available from the author on request. 
L;'We rely only on the number of mistakes reported by graders. In other tenus, we did not 
check whether the mistakes reported by the graders were the actual mistakes. 
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trolling for sorne individual characteristics (see Table 2.5). To do so, we exploit 
the panel structure of the experimental data to estimate a model of the form: 
(2.1) 
where Yi,t is the absolute difference between the number of mistakes reported 
by subject 'Î for exam paper t (t = 1, ... , la) and the actual number of mistakes 
in exam paper t. Xi,t is the vector of independent variables. These indepen-
dent variables include the subject's age (Age), the subject's gender (Female: 1 
if female, a otherwise), as weIl as experimental treatment dummies. We con-
trol for the ranking of the exam papers (Paper Ranking, 01 to 10) as weIl as 
interactions between the ranking and experimental treatments. Exam paper 
fixed effects are also included in the regression (although not reported). To 
control for possible grader specifie random effects, we model the error term as 
Wi,t = 'Ui + êi,t, where Var(êi,t) = a~, and Var ('Ui) = a~ .16 The model is esti-
mated by FGLS with clustered standard errors to take into account correlation 
of unknown form among the la observations of each grader Y 
The estimation results are presented in Table 2.6, column "Lab". Moni-
toring and High Monitoring significantly increase graders' precision compared 
to the Control treatment. Yet, precision is not significantly different between 
Monitoring and High Monitoring. Gift-exchange has no significant effect on 
graders' effort. The results of the regression regarding treatment effects are 
therefore consistent with the results of the Mann-Whitney tests. In addition, 
Hi Breusch-Pagan LM tests for random etfects reject the null hypothesis that (T~ = 0 in ail 
three regressions of Table 2.6. 
17 The statistical software used is Stata 9. Alternative specifications of equation(2.1) yield 
results similar to those discussed here. In particular, using two-way random etfects or using 
a count model (Poisson) do es not change the results. 
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Table 2.6 indicates that women and younger subjects are more precise in their 
grading. The coefficients of the interaction terms between Paper Ranking and 
the Monitoring and High Monitoring treatments are positive and significant. 
These coefficients suggest that while monitoring increases effort level, the ef-
fects may weaken over time. 
2.4.2 Robustness Check 
In this section, we first discuss the results of the field experiment in Oua-
gadougou, without pooling the data. Table 2.3, columns "Field", gives an 
overview of the graders' work. As in the lab, graders find fewer mistakes than 
actually present in an exam paper. 
Table 2.4, columns "Field", provides summary statistics on the average 
absolute deviation in Ouagadougou. This table shows that the average absolute 
deviation is lower in the Monitoring and High Monitoring treatment compared 
to the Control treatment. The differences with the Control treatment are 
both significant at the 1% level (p-value = 0.002 for Monitoring, and p-value 
= 0.004 for High Monitoring, Mann-Whitney). However, High Monitoring does 
not significantly increase effort relative to Monitoring (p-value = 0.475, Mann-
Whitney). Table 2.4 also shows that gift-exchange slightly increases absolute 
average deviation relative to the Control treatment, but the difference is not 
significant (p-value = 0.756, Mann-Whitney). 
Table 2.6, column "Field", presents regression results using only data from 
the field in Ouagadougou. The dependent variable, the independent variables, 
and the regression model used are identical to those described in section 4.1. 
Regarding treatment effects, the regression results are consistent with those 
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obtained using Mann-Whitney tests. Moreover, we find that women are sig-
nificantly more precise than men, while the subject's age has no explanatory 
power in the field. Again, the effect of monitoring may weaken over time as 
suggested by the coefficients of the interaction terms between Paper Ranking 
and each of the two monitoring treatments. 
The preceding results show that the direction of treatment effects are the 
same in the field in Ouagadougou and in the lab in Montreal. We therefore turn 
to the analysis of the magnitude of the treatment effects. To do so, we pool 
together the data from the lab and the field. We also include in equation (2.1) 
a dummy variable Field (1 if a field grader, 0 otherwise), as weIl as interaction 
terms between experimental treatment dummies and Field. Note that the Field 
dummy captures the differences between the lab in Montreal and the field in 
Ouagadougou, including the fact that subjects in the field are unaware they 
are in an experiment; 
The results are reported in Table 2.6, column "Pooled Data". 18 The Field 
variable shows that the level of. absolute deviation differs between the lab in 
Montreal and the field in Ouagadougou. Indeed, graders in the field are signif-
icantly less precise than graders in the labo To sorne extent, this is a surprising 
result as we could have expected graders in the lab not to give their best effort 
compared to the field where subjects thought they were grading a "real" exam. 
Once we control for the environment (lab vs. field) and location (Burkina 
Faso vs. Canada) through the variable Field, we find no significant difference 
between the lab and the field regarding the magnitude of treatment effects. In-
LX Notice that the re~mlts regarding treatment etfects obtained with the pooled data are 
consistent with the results obtained using lab and field data separately. 
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deed, the coefficients of the interaction terms between experimental treatment 
dummies and Field are aIl statisticaIly insignificant at conventionallevels. 
In our experimènt, we instructed graders to find aIl the mistakes in a given 
exam paper. However, recall that reporting 15 or more mistakes is considered 
a failure. In the Control treatment, graders may have an incentive to grade 
seriously only until they find16 mistakes in a paper, as from there on, the paper 
is failing "anyway". In contrast, in the monitoring treatments, graders have an 
incentive to find aIl the mistakes in an exam paper to avoid being penalized. As 
a result, the observed effects of monitoring may be mainly driven by papers with 
16 or more mistakes, which may have been graded seriously in the monitoring 
treatments but not in the Control treatment. In an attempt to explore this 
hypothesis, we divided the sample in two groups of exam papers according to 
the actual number of mistakes (papers with 15 or less mistakes, and those with 
more than 15 mistakes). We run a regression for each group with the pooled 
sample. The results from these regressions (see Table 2.7) are consistent with 
those presented above. 
To summarize, we find that the direction and the magnitude of treatment 
effects are the same in the lab in Montreal and in the field in Ouagadougou. In 
our view, this result is remarkable as it suggests that labor market lab behavior 
in developed countries may generalized to real world situations in developing 
countries, despite different economic, political and cultural contexts. 19 
l!JFor a discussion of conditions under which lab behavior is likely or not to be a close 
guide of behavior in the field, see Levitt and List (2007a, 2007b). 
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2.4.3 Discussion 
vVe find the following treatment effects both in the lab in Montreal and in the 
field in Ouagadougou. First, monitoring increases overall effort, indicating that 
monitoring may be effective in a mission-oriented setup. This is in contrast to 
sever al profit-oriented lab experiments reporting that the crowding-out effects 
of monitoring may outweigh its disciplining effects (e.g. Fehr and Giichter 2002, 
Falk and Kosfeld 2006). However, High Monitoring does not increase workers' 
effort relative to Monitoring, suggesting that monitoring becomes ineffective 
above a given threshold. Second, gift-exchange does not increase the effort 
level of graders. This lends sorne support to experimental studies questioning 
the robustness of gift-exchange in labor markets (e.g. Engelmann and Ortmann 
2002, Gneezy and List 2006, Hennig-Schmidt, Rockenbach, and Sadrieh 2008). 
Finally, put together, our results suggest that monitoring may be more effective 
than gift-exchange in eliciting workers' effort in a mission-orientedsetup.2o 
To explain the results above, we conjecture that sorne workers in the mission-
oriented sector may be intrinsically motivated to accomplish their "mission" 
and are not likely to reduce their effort level when monitored. At the same time, 
monitoring may increase the effort level of agents with low intrinsic motivation, 
leading to higher overall effort in the two monitoring treatments relative to the 
Control treatment. Gift-exchange does not affect the effort level of neither an 
intrinsically motivated agent (because he is already motivated to work hard) 
nor of a selfish agent (because he is a self-maximizer). 
We attempt to explore these conjectures below. To this end, we separate 
1!1To Home extent, such conclusion is in line with Burgess et al. (2004)'s empirical study 
which indicates that performance pay may be more cost effective than a general pay rise in 
a public work context. 
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motivated graders from selfish graders by using the graders' decision to reject a 
bribe üffer as a proxy for intrinsic motivation. Indeed, self-maximizing behavior 
should result in accèpting the bribe offer, noting in particular that bribe accep-
tance was arguably without consequence in the lab and in the field. 21 Graders 
who rejected the bribe are considèred motivated, while those who accepted the 
bribe are considered selfish.22 We divided our sample accordingly, and run a 
FGLS regression (see equation 2.1) for each group, pooling the data from the 
lab and the field togethèr.23 We use the same variables as in Table 2.6, column 
"Pooled Data", except for interaction terms between the. Field variable and 
experimental treatments. 
Table 2.8 presents the regression results, which are broadly support ive of 
our conjectures. We focus on the treatment effects. Relative to thE;) Control 
treatment, the Monitoring and High Monitoring treatment do not affect the 
effort level of motivated graders. They tend to work as hard with as witho~t 
monitoring. When a majority of workers are motivated, it may therefore be 
possible to save on incentivè schemes such as monitoring. By contrast, com-. 
pared to the Control treatment, selfish graders work significantly harder both 
210utside an experimental framework, bribe acceptance may be extremely difficult to 
detect in the field Ïn a corruption situation similar to the one we modeled. 
2264.24% of graders accepted the bribe in the lab, and 46.83% accepted in the field. In 
total, 54.24% of graders accepted the bribe. 
23Chronologically, the first 10 papers are graded before graders are aware they will have to 
make a decision relating to bribery. For this reason, we consider the "Absolute Deviation" 
as a predetermined (lagged) variable and use it as an explicative variable of bribe acceptance 
in Chapter 3. For the same reason, bribe acceptance is considered to have no effect of the 
grading of the 10 first papers. In section 2.5, we attempt to analyze the impact of the level 
of intrinsic ·motivation on the effectiveness of monitoring, by dividing graders according to 
whether or not they accepted the bribe. However, doing so i~plicitly turns bribe acceptance 
into a determinant of graders' performance, in contrast to' our initial assumptions. As a 
result, the results in Table 2.8 must only be seen as indicative, and should not be considered 
as a formaI test of whether the effectiveness of monitoring depends on the level of intrinsic 
motivation. 
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in the Monitoring and the High Monitoring treatment.24 Therefore, monitoring 
appears to have a significant disciplining effect on selfish graders. Finally, the 
Gift-exchange treatment has no significant effect neither on motivated graders 
nor on selfish graders. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter extends the analysis of the disciplining and crowding-out effect 
of monitoring ta mission-oriented organizations. To model. a mission-oriented 
work context, we use a Principal-AgE:)nt-Client framework in which graders are 
hired by the _experimenter to grade eXall papers pertaining to can~idates. We 
induce a sense of "mission" in performing the experimental task by requiring 
real-effort from both types of subject. 
In the lab in Montreal, we find that monitoring significantly increases ef-
fort level relative to the Control treatment. So, even if monitoring had hidden 
costs, they may not have been sufficient to undermine completely its effective-
ness in our mission-oriented setup. However, monitoring becomes ineffective in 
increasing effort when it is above a certain threshold, suggesting a crowding-
out effect. Moreover, our results indicate that the effect of monitoring may 
we8ken over time. It may therefore be interesting to analyze monitoring taking 
into account the duration of the task in future research. Gift exchange does 
not increase effort, indicatiilg that monitoring may be a better alternative in a 
mission-oriented setup. 
To assess the generalizability of the results obtained in the lab, a field 
24 Note that the regression coefficients associated to these two treatments are not signifi-
cantly different. 
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experiment with a similar design is conducted in Ouagadougou. In addition to . 
the location, a difference between the lab and the field design is that subjects 
in the field are not aware they are taking part in an experiment. Nevertheless, 
the direction and the magnitude of treatment effects are congruent between the 
lab in Montreal and the field in Ouagadougou. Our lab results may therefore 
generalize to a field setting. 
Note that several distinctive features of the mission-oriented sector have 
not been examined in thischapter, such as performance measurability issues, 
. multi-principals, or multi-tasking (for a more comprehensive discussion, see e.g. 
Wright 2001 or Dixit 2002). More studies are still needed to better understand 
the interplay between psychological and pecuniary incentives in the mission-
oriented sector, and to determine the conditions under which non-pecuniary 
incentives such as gift-exchange may have significant impacts on work effort in 
this sector. 
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Tables 
Table 2.1 
,,,-,, ' , " -~ ,~-~ ",",< ~" "-,-"",,.~ ,~, -, ,~-,., . ~ , .. " ~ 
Penalties in the Monitoring Treatment 
If the difference is : Lab (in EU) Field (in FCFA) 
Between 0 and 2 mistakes 0 0 
Between 3 and 5 mistakes 50 1000 
Between 6 and 9 mistakes 100 2000 
10 mistakes or more 200 4000 
Table 2.2 
Penalties in the Hlgh Monitoring Treatment 
If the maximum difference is : Lab (in EU) Field (in FCFA) 
Between 0 and 2 mistakes 0 0 
Between 3 and 5 mistakes 100 2000 
Between 6 and 9 mistakes 150 3000 
10 mistakes or more 225 4500 
Table 2.3 
Average Number of Reported Mistakes 
Treatments 
~ ~ " •• ~ ". >- - ~ ~- ."" ~ 
Control Monitoring High Monitoring Gift Exchange 
Paper Actual 
Numberof Lab Field Lab Field Lab Field Lab Field Rank 
Mistakes 
1 15 12.194 11.976 13.473 12.817 13.875 13.045 12.968 12.150 
2 24 18.984 17.634 20.764 19.378 20.125 19.545 19.419 17.077 
3 6 5.887 5.524 5.964 5.744 5.656 5.932 5.774 5.375 
4 25 18.323 16.317 20.527 18.207 20.156 18.477 19.290 16.250 
5 16 12.597 11.683 13.236 12.659 13.094 12.932 12.935 11.975 
6 5 4.145 4.049 4.436 3.976 4.094 4.000 4.194 3.650 
7 20 15.855 14.195 17.182 15.024 16.281 15.432 16.000 14.150 
8 11 9.435 8.793 10.000 9.037 9.563 9.023 10.129 8.800 
9 19 15.403 14.366 16.418 15.378 15.906 14.727 15.645 14.150 
10 14 11.790 11.220 12.256 11.707 11.969 11.773 11.710 10.875 
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Table 2.4 
, . 
Average Absolute Deviation 
Treatments 
Control Monitoring High Monitoring Gift Exchange 
Lab Field Lab Field Lab Field Lab Field 
Obs. 62 82 55 82 32 43 31 39 
Mean 3.171 4.032 2.209 3.161 2.522 3.153 3.003 4.082 
Median 2.800 3.650 2.200 3.200 2.500 2.800 2.800 4.000 
Std.Dev. 1.543 1.804 1.157 1.293 1.501 1.933 1.453 2.06 
Min 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 
Max 7.4 9.3 5.5 6.3 5.7 10.9 6.8 11.2 
Table 2.5 
Subject Pool Characteristics 
Age Gender 
Lab Field Lab Field 
A-..erage 26.612 24.665 0.444 0.129 
Standard DelAation 6.549 2.271 0.498 0.336 
Min 18 20 0 0 
Max 54 30 1 1 
No ofObs. 178 248 180 248 
Table 2.6 
GLS Regression of Grading Quality by Environment 
Dependent Variable: Absolute De-.1ation 
Independent Variables Lab Field Pooled Data 
Age 0.044'*** (0.015) 0.011 (0.048) 0.040 *** (0.014) 
Female -0.713:***1(0.204) -0.751 **(0.332) -0.719 *** (0.181) 
Monitoring Treatment -1.305;***' (0.335) -1.328*** (0.321) -1.256,*** (0.275) 
High Monitoring Treatment -1.376:***,(0.361 ) -1.490 *** (0.396) -1.343*** (0.336) 
Gift Exchange Treatment -0.132; :(0.475) -0.075 (0.479) -0.030' '(0.380) 
Paper Ranking -0.043: i(0.029) -0.034: (0.025) -0.038 **(0.019) 
Paper Ranking*Monitoring Treatment 0.082 1** '(0.042) 0.068** (0.031 ) 0.074'*** (0.025) 
Paper Ranking*High Monitoring Treatment 0.123'***(0.044) 0.111 ,*** (0.038) 0.116*** (0.029) 
Paper Ranking*Gift Exchange Treatment 0.037! 1(0.051) 0.004: (0.040) 0.018 (0.032) 
Field i ! , 0.850 *** (0.287) 
Field*Monitoring Treatment i 
, 
-0.100 (0.337) 
Field*High Monitoring Treatment l -0.221 (0.474) , 
Field*Gift Exchange Treatment ! -0.143 (0.488) 
Constant 1.8411***:(0.516) 3.120 ***(1.177) 1.725*** (0.470) 
ObseMtions 1780 2478 4258 
Number of graders 178 248 426 
au 1.209 1.608 1.448 
.. Notes: 1) robust standard errors ln parentheses, clustered ln graders; Il) exam paper fixed effects 
included; iii) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 2.7 
GLS Regression of Grading Quality by Exams' Type 
Dependent Variable: Absolute De'-Ïation 
Inde pendent Variables Actual Mistakes (15 or less) Actual Mistakes (>15) 
Age 0.026:*** (0.010) 0.054 ** (0.021 ) 
Female -0.450:*** ·(0.117) -0.989 *** (0.265) 
Monitoring Treatment -0.654'*** (0.207) -1.941 *** (0.427) 
High Monitoring Treatment -0.7901*** (0.232) -2.035*** (0.555) 
Gift Exchange Treatment -0.028' (0.314) 0.029 . (0.562) 
Paper Ranking -0.0191 '(0.018) -0.230 *** (0.036) 
Paper Ranking*Monitoring Treatment 0.037: (0.023) 0.128 ***(0.049) 
Paper Ranking*High Monitoring Treatment 0.068:** (0.028) 0.191 *** (0.059) 
Paper Ranking*Gift Exchange Treatment 0.0281 (0.031 ) -0.003 (0.059) 
Field 0.3721* (0.192) 1.328 *** (0.407) 
Field*Monitoring Treatment -0.053 1 '(0.225) -0.147 (0.485) 
Field*High Monitoring Treatment -0.078; (0.318) -0.359' .(0.680) 
Field*Gift Exchange Treatment -0.174' :(0.332) -0.107 (0.712) 
Constant 1.969'*** '(0.334) 4.466 *** (0.702) 
Observations 2129 2129 
Number of graders 426 426 
au 0.852 2.078 
.. Notes: 1) robust standard errors ln parentheses. clustered ln graders; Il) exam paper fixed effects 
included; iii) *** p<O.01. ** p<0.05. * p<0.1; iv) a paper should tail if the actual number of mistakes is 
(itrictlym()rethéln 1!). it shou!~ p'~s(i other.vis..~' 
Table 2.8 
GLS Regression of Grading Quality by Graders' Type 
Dependent Variable: Absolute De'..1ation 
Independent Variables Motivated Graders Selfish Graders 
Age 0.064'** '(0.025) 0.028 (0.021) 
Female -1.058,*** :(0.279) -0.548** (0.251 ) 
Monitoring Treatment -0.416' ;(0.361 ) -1.926 *** (0.324) 
High Monitoring Treatment -0.599' '(0.371 ) -2.101 *** (0.360) 
Gift Exchange Treatment 0.280, (0.433) -0.104: (0.500) 
Paper Ranking 0.028: '(0.029) -0.062*** (0.024) 
Paper Ranking*Monitoring Treatment -0.021 i ;(0.044) 0.117*** (0.029) 
Paper Ranking*High Monitoring Treatment 0.0381 ;(0.043) 0.164'*** (0.038) 
Paper Ranking*Gift Exchange Treatment -O.018! '(0.042) 0.011 '(0.048) 
Field 0.710!** '(0.309) 0.792 *** (0.236) 
Constant 0.5841 (0.795) 2.297 *** (0.610) 
Observations 1620 1918 
Number of graders 162 192 
au 1.531 1.474 
.. Notes: 1) robust standard errors ln parentheses, clustered ln graders; Il) exam paper fixed effects 
included; iii) *** p<0.01, ** p<q.05, * p<0.1. 
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Chapitre 3 
Can corruption be studied in 
the lab? 
60 
3.1 Introduction 
The micro-determinants of corruption, as weIl as possible anti-corruption mea-
sures have recently been studied in lab experiments conducted in developed 
countries. If shown to be externaIly valid (Le. to be relevant for the real 
world) , then lab experiments could become one of the most effective tools to 
study corruption. One may wonder, however, whether the lab provides an 
appropriate setting to study corruption. Indeed, although non-monetary con-
siderations (e.g. moral, ethical, legal or cultural) may be major determinants of 
corruption, they may be difficult to capture in lab experiments. In the present 
chapter, we make an attempt at l.esting whether lab experiments conducted in 
developed countries can be used to study corruption where arguably it matters 
the most, the field in developing countries. To do so, we propose to compare 
the out cornes of a corruption experiment conducted in the lab in Montreal 
(Canada), and in the field in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). 
There is ample evidence that corruption is now recognized as one of the most 
detrimental factors to economic and social development. First, corruption has 
become a prime concern for major international institutions. In particular, the 
International Monetary Fund considers that corruption "clearly is detrimental 
to economic activity and welfare".1 Similarly, the World Bank declared that it 
"has identified corruption as the single greatest obstacle to economic and social 
development" . 2 Second, sever al countries have intensified their fight against 
corruption. This may be best exemplified with the case of China where for 
the first time a high ranking official (the previous head of the Food and Drug 
1 http://www.imf.org/external/I1P/exr/facts/gov.htm. 
"http://web.worldbal1k.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORAND 
GOVERNANCE/EXTANTICORRlPTION/O"menuPK:384461-pagePK:149018-piPK 
: 149093- theSitePK:384455,OO.html). 
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Administration) was executed on July 10, 2007 after admitting to taking bribes. 
Likewise, Hong Kong created a legal precedent by implementing a "guilty until 
proven innocent" approach toward individuals accused of corruption. Finally, 
as discussed in a subsequent section, the last two decades have witnessed a 
sharp increase in the production of academie work related to corruption, not 
only in economics but also in sociology, political science, and law. 
There is no comprehensive or widely accepted definition of corruption. It 
is generally agreed to include such activities as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, 
nepotism, extortion, or influence peddling. Corruption, however, is occasion-
ally interpreted in a broader sense to encompass any activity lacking integrity, 
virtue, or moral. The definition of corruption is also sensitive to cultural fac-
tors. What may be considered corruption in a country, may simply reflect 
politeness or traditional gift exchange in a different country. Corruption is not 
necessarily illegal. For instance, although legal in several countries, lobbying 
and politieal contributions are deemed corrupt by most. Likewise, corruption is 
not necessarily considered immoral. For instance, favoritism toward one's own 
kind may be perceived as natural and justified. Corruption may be collective or 
individual, organized or incident al , politieal or bureaucratie. The latter is the 
form generally considered in economics where corruption is typically defined 
as an abuse of public office for private gain. Most agree that although corrup-
tion occurs in aIl countries, it is more prevalent and damaging in developing 
countries. Corruption affects all sectors of the economy, from tax collection 
to publie contracting, from the justiee to the education or health systems. In 
the present chapter, we adopt the economists' definition of corruption, and we 
design an experiment related to bribery in the education system. 
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Due in part to its covered nature, the analysis of corruption has been chal-
lenging to economists. In fact, it may be argued that the theoretical and 
empirical approaches to corruption have been of limited practical impact to 
understand and combat corruption. Experimental economics, on the other 
hand, could become the most promising approach to understand the determi-
nants of corruptibility, and test possible anti-corruption measures. Indeed, lab 
experiments offer the economist the possibility to overcome the unobservability 
of corrupt activities by generating hard data, while controlling both the envi-
ronment and the characteristics of the subjects' population. The experimental 
literature on corruption, however, is in its infancy and its practical relevance 
will not be fully established as long as the question of external validity remains 
unaddressed. In other words, we need to test the extent to which the results of 
corruption experiments obtained in the lab can be extrapolated to real-life sit-
uations in the field. As argued by (e.g.) List (2006a) or Levitt and List (2007), 
a lab and a field ex periment on corruption cou Id produce different out cornes 
as sorne features of the experiment are unlikely to be exactly the same in the 
two environments. In particular, the nature of the game played, the stakes, or 
the subject pool may differ between the lab and the field. Testing the external 
validity of corruption experiments is therefore necessary and legitimate. 
The present chapter may be considered a first step in this direction. In-
deed, although the vast majority of experimentallabs are located in developed 
countries, understanding and fighting corruption is considered most relevant 
to developing countries. It is therefore important to know whether the experi-
mental results obtained in the lab in developed countries can be extrapolated 
to the field in developing countries. To address this question, we carried out a 
traditional lab experiment in Montreal, while in Ouagadougou, we conducted 
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what Harrison and List (2004) refer to as a natural field experiment in which 
the subjects do not know they are participants in an experiment. Our goal is 
to test whether the direction and/or the magnitude of various treatment ef-
fects are comparable when the same experiment is conducted in the lab and 
in the field. Note that we are not trying to demonstrate that one environ-
ment is superior to the other for the analysis of corruption. Like Harrison and 
List (2004), we believe that the lab and the field can complement each other, 
even when they produce slightly different outcomes. Our research project may 
then be interpreted as an effort to identify the dimensions in which the results 
obtained in the two environments concur or differ when analyzing corruption. 
We may then understand better how the lab and the field may be used as 
complementary approaches to study the determinants of corruption, as weIl as 
anti-corruption measures. 
Moving from the lab to the field without losing too much control is never an 
easy task. It is even more challenging in the case of corruption, as it is typically 
considered an illegal and immoral activity. To design our experiment we strived 
to minimize the possible losses of control under the constraints imposed by the 
lab and the field. The solution we propose aims at reproducing a corruption 
scenario in which a candidate off ers a bribe to a grader in order to obtain a 
better grade. In short, subjects in the lab and in the field were asked to grade 
the same set of 20 exam papers in the same order. The Uth paper came with 
a money offer and a message stating: "Please, find few mistakes in my exam 
paper". The key difference between the two environments is that subjects in 
the field were informed they participated in an experiment only after grading 
was completed. We conducted four different treatments, each in the lab and in 
the field, by varying successively i) the amount of the bribe, ii) the wagepaid 
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to graders, and iii) the level of monitoring and punishment. 
The experimental results indicate that the probability to accept a bribe 
decreases with the grader's age, religiousness and ability at the grading task. 
Gender, however, seems to have no significant effect. Controlling for these indi-
vidual characteristics, we find that increasing the wage paid to graders lowers 
their probability of accepting the bribe. Monitoring and possible sanctions 
appear to have no significant effect on the graders' acceptance behavior. The 
direction and the magnitude of the previous two treatment effects are statisti-
cally indistinguishable between the lab and the field. The two environments, 
however, differ in sorne dimensions. In particular, we find that increasing the 
amount of the bribe has no effect in the lab, while it éxacerbates corruption in 
the field. 
We also find that graders who accept the bribe are more likely to favor the 
briber by reporting fewer mistakes. Once we control for individual character-
istics, we find that, unlike men, women respond to monitoring by failing the 
briber more often. In addition, graders who accept the bribe are more likely to 
help the briber when they receive a higher wage. These two treatment effects 
are similar in the lab and in the field. There is, however, a notable difference 
between the two environments: when the bribe is increased, accepters in the 
field are more likely to reciprocate by providing a passing grade to the briber. 
No such behavior is observed in the labo 
Finally, we find that accepting the bribe affects how subjects subsequently 
perform the grading task. Indeed, the grades reported for the remaining nine 
exam papers by subjects who accept the bribe are significantly less accurate and 
more inconsistent. In the l-ligh Monitoring treatment, however, subjects who 
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accept the bribe do a better job at grading the last exam papers, possibly in 
an effort to lower their expected penalty. Once again, no significant difference 
between the lab and the field can be identified. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly 
summarizes the theoretical, empirical and experimental literature related to 
corruption. The experimental treatments are presented in section 3. In section 
4, we discuss the experimental design relative to the study of corruption. The 
experimental results are analyzed in section 5. Finally, we discuss in section 6 
the practical implications of our results. 
3.2 Literature Review 
We provide here a short summary of the economic literature pertaining to 
corruption.3 In doing so, we try to highlight the practical contributions, as 
weIl as the possible limitations of the theoretical, empirical, and experimental 
approaches. 
3.2.1 Theoretical and Empirical Approaches 
Most of the theoretical literature on corruption builds on Becker (1968) and 
Rose-Ackerman (1975), who were the first to analyze in a formaI setting the eco-
nomics of crime and corruption respectively. This literature is mainly based on 
resource allocation and contract theories (J ain 2001). The first maj or theoret-
ical debate concerned whether corruption can increase welfare. While initially 
:IFor more comprehensive sur veys of the economic literature on corruption, see Bardhan 
(1997) or Jain (2001). For a survey focusing more specifically on the theoretical approach, see 
Aidt (2003). For reviews of the empirical literature, see Lanyi (2004), Dreher and Herzfeld 
(2005) or Seldadyo and Haan (2006). Finally, for surveys of laboratory experiments on 
corruption see Dusek, Ortmann and Lizal (2005), as weil as Abbink (2006). 
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seen as "grease-in-the-wheel" (Lui 1985), corruption has been mostly found 
to reduce welfare by acting as "sand-in-the-wheel".4 Another major branch 
of the theoretical literature is concerned with evaluating possible corruption 
deterrents such as higher wages (Becker and Stigler 1974, Mookherjee and Png 
1995, Sosa 2004), increased monitoring (Besley and McLaren 1993, Mookher-
jee and Png 1995, Acemoglu and Verdier 1998), stiffer penalties (Besley and 
McLaren 1993, Mookherjee and Png 1995, Acemoglu and Verdier 1998), and 
increase competition between potential bribees (Rose-Ackerman 1978, Shleifer 
and Vishny 1993). Most of this literature did not produce unambiguous pre-
dictions. As a result, it may be argued that the theoretical approach has 
been of limited practical impact to combat corruption. In addition, balancing 
the monetary costs and benefits of corruption may be considered too limit-
ing of an approach (see e.g. Bukovansky 2006). In particular, accounting for 
non-monetary factors, such as ethical, moral, cultural and religious factors, 
may be necessary to better understand corruptibility and devise effective anti-
corruption measures. 
Corruption may typically be considered an illicit and secret ive activity. As 
a result, it is virtually impossible to observe and measure directly. This lack of 
hard data partially explains the absence of rigorous empirical analyses of cor-
ruption prior to the mid 90's. To circumvent the observability problem, surveys 
aimed at evaluating corruption perceptions have been conducted around the 
world since the mid 1980's. Starting with the pioneer work of Mauro (1995L 
and Knack and Keefer (1995), these surveys have been used by economists 
to study -corruption, giving rise to a burgeoning empirical literature. A first 
ISee e.g. Shleifer and Vishl1y (1993), Banerjee (1997), Bliss and Di Tella (1997), or Ades 
and Di Tella (1999). 
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branch of this literature is concerned with the link between corruption and eco-
nomic activity. The bulk of the research tends to conclude that corruption is 
harmful, as it appears to hinder growth (Méon and Sekkat 2005), widen income 
inequality (Gyimah-Brempong 2002), discourage investments (Wei 2000), and 
cause misallocations of public expenditures (Mauro 1997). A second branch of 
the empirical literature attempts to identify the causes of corruption. In partic-
ular, wealth and corruption have been found to be correlated, but the direction 
of the relationship appears to be ambiguous.5 Corruption has also been found 
to be lower in countries open to foreign trade (Knack and Azfar 2003), with 
high human capital (Brunetti and Weder 2003), and a higher participation of 
women to the labour force (Swamy et al. 2001). Finally, several studies find 
that higher wages reduce corruption (e.g. van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001), 
while others find no support for this common hypothesis (Rauch and Evans 
2000). 
The empirical approach to corruption has been criticized on several fronts. 6 
First and foremost, corruption indices are believed to suffer .from significant 
measurement errors. 7 Second, the direction of causality, although often far from 
obvious, cannot be established with reduced form approaches. For instance, 
regression models cannot test whether corruption exacerbates poverty, or in 
contrast, whether corruption is more likely to breed in poor countries. Finally, 
3While most studies find a negative correlation (Hall and Jones 1999, Fisman and Gatti 
2002, Serra 2006), some find that wealth and corruption are positively related (e.g. Braun 
and Di Tella 2004, Frechette 2001). 
üFor a Ravor of the debate pertaining to the measure of corruption with survey data, see 
Golden and Picci (2005) or Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006). 
'In particular, .Johnston (2001) argues that perception based surveys are skewed toward 
petty bribery (as it is the most visible to the public), while the economic impact of grand 
corruption is much greater. Lanyi (2004) also notes that respondents may be reluctant to 
answer these surveys honestly if they have been directly involved in corrupt transactions. In 
particular, Murrell and Azfar (2005) estimate that roughly 40% of their sample was reticent 
in answering questions about corruption. 
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there is a glaring void in the empirical literature when it cornes to testing 
anti-corruption measures.8 This void may be explained in part by the lack of 
micro-Ievel data. 
3.2.2 Experimental Approach 
The experimental approach to corruption is the most recent, with the first 
published paper dating back to the beginning of the decade (Frank and Schulze 
2000). The bulk of corruption experiments has been conducted in the lab 
where two forms of corruption have been studied: embezzlement and bribery. 
While embezzlement experiments use dictator games to study corruptibility in 
a single decision making, bribery experiments build on the trust game literature 
to study corruption in a strategic environment. 
These lab experiments produced the following results. Barr, Lindelow and 
Serneels (2004) as well as Jacquemet (2005) find a negative correlation be-
tween wages and corruption, while no such treatment effect has been detected 
in other studies (Le. Frank and Schulze 2000, Abbink 2002, Schulze and Frank 
2003). A deterrence effect is found in staff rotation (Abbink 2004), as well as 
in monitoring and punishment (Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner 2002, Schulze 
and Frank 2003, Barr et al. 2004). The results in Frank and Schulze (2000), 
as well as Rivas (2006) suggest that women may be less corrupt than men, 
although Alatas et al. (2009a) suggest that the effect may depend on cultural 
factors. Likewise, tolerance with respect to corruption may differ across cul-
tures (Cameron et al. 2006) and subject pools (Alatas et al. 2009b). Finally, 
the use of loaded instructions does not appear to generate a treatment effect 
. '~There are a few notable exceptions including Brunetti and Weder (2003), Reinikka and 
Svensson (2004), or Fernu: and Finan (2008). 
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(Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt 2006, Barr et al. 2004). 
We are only aware of two published field experiments directly related to 
corruption.!> As argued below, this void may be explained by the difficulty 
in designing field experiments on corruption. The first study, conducted by 
Bertrand et al. (2006) with subjects applying for a driver's license in New Delhi, 
combines experimental and survey methods to test the "grease-the-wheel" hy-
pothesis. The second study, conducted by Olken (2007) in lndonesia, analyzes 
the efficacy of audit and grass-roots participation as anti-embezzlement mea-
sures in road construction projects. lO 
Although still not fully mature, the experimental approach to corruption 
may be considered very promising. lndeed, experimental economics has proved 
to be most useful in three situations, which each applies to corruption. First, 
when naturally-occurring data are scarce, or do not vary along certain de-
sired dimensions. This is the case with corruption which is difficult to ob-
serve directly, and which is rarely observed under different wage, monitoring 
or punishment regimes. In such cases, lab experiments enable the economist 
to generate data in order to identify the causal relationship between two vari-
ables of interest (e.g., between wages and corruption). Second, to identify the 
micro-determinants of corrupt behavior. Although crucial to understand and 
combat corruption, which micro-Ievel factors explain corrupt behavior remain 
!lSome empirical studies have been conducted with data obtained after natural experi-
ments (see e.g. Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003, or Reinikka and Svensson 2004). We do 
not consider these to be field experiments as the researchers had no control over the design 
of the experiments. Recent unpublished field experiments on corruption include Castillo et 
al. (2008). 
lllNote that in both of these studies, corruption is not observed directly. As a consequence, 
alternative explanations of the results are possible. For instance, although they provide some 
evidence to the contrary, Bertrand et al. (2006) cannot exclude that, instead of resorting to 
corruption (as assumed by the authors), subjects sim ply exerted more effort to obtain their 
driver's licence. 
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essentially an open question that neither the theoretical nor the empirical ap-
proach has been able to address adequately. As the economist controls both 
the experimental design and the characteristics of the subjects' population, the 
lab provides a unique framework to identify the micro-determinants of behav-
ior. Third, lab experiments have proved to be a useful first step in the area of 
policy-making when a trial-and-error approach is either too costly or impossi-
ble to implement in the field. ll As argued by (e.g.) Dusek, Ortmann and Lizal 
(2005) and Abbink (2006), lab experiments could constitute a cost effective 
"wind tunnel" to test potential policies aimed at curbing corruption. 
The experimental literature on corruption, however, is in its infancy, and 
its practical relevance will not be fully established as long as the question of 
external validity remains unaddressed. In other words, we need to evaluate the 
extent to which the results of corruption experiments obtained in the lab can be 
extrapolated to real-life situations in the field. There are at least four potential 
reasons why the two environments could produce different results. 12 First, the 
stakes in the lab might differ from those in the field. In lab experiIùents, the 
::;takes are essentially limited to "free money" provided by the experimenter. In 
the field, one of the party is entitled to the money, and the stakes may not be 
purely monetary. For instance, corruption may lead to imprisonment, physical 
harm, and in the most extreme cases, death. Similarly, corruption in the field 
may have moral or social implications that may be difficult to replicate in the 
Il For examples of how experimel1ts have helped in the design of various policies and mar-
kets. see Plott (1999), Roth (2002), Klemperer (2004), or Ivlilgrom (2004). 
12There are several examples in the literature showillg that behavior in the lab does not 
llecessarily extel1d to the field. For instance, List (2006b) finds significant discrepancies 
between the lab and the field whell allalyzing the behavior of sportscard dealers. Likewise, 
Henrich et al. (2001) find that behavior in ultimatum, dictator, and public goods games 
<liffers llotably from the lab when conducted in the field in developing countries. See also, 
(e.g.) List (20061.1.) or Levitt and List (2007), for a discussion of potential factors that may 
explain why a lab and a field experimel1t may produce differel1t outcomes. 
71 
labo Second, the game played in the lab and in the field may be different. In 
the lab, corruption is often modeled as a one shot game played in a context-
free environment between anonymous subjects. In the field, corruption may 
involve repeated interactions between parties who can identify each other, and 
whose decisions may have life long consequences. Third, the players may be 
different in the lab and the field. Although· efforts have been made to extend 
the subjects' population, the roles in a lab experiment are typically assigned 
randomly to a self-selected group of students. In contrast, the distribution of 
roles in the field may be endogenous. For instance, it is possible that officiaIs 
have learned to become corrupt, or that they have deliberately chosen their 
position because they are intrinsically more corruptible. Fourth, subjects in 
the lab know they are being scrutinized. As a result, Levitt and List (2007) 
argue that lab subjects may be inclined to make the "moral" choice when 
morality and wealth are competing objectives, as it is the case with corruption. 
3.3 Experimental Treatments 
The basic idea behind the experiment is to reproduce a corruption scenario in 
which a candidate proposes a bribe to a grader in order to obtain a better grade. 
As further explained in section 4, we concentrate on the graders' behavior in 
order to maintain as much control as possible over the experiment. In other 
words, although we have subjects acting as candidates, their role is essentially 
passive. 
We conducted four different grading treatments. Each treatment was con-
ducted both in the lab and in the field. In the Control treatment, subjects 
were paid a fixed amount for their grading, regardless of how they performed 
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the task. In addition, graders in the Control treatment were offered a bribe. 
In the lab, the fixed amount was 250 Experimental Units (EU hereafter) and 
the bribe was 50 EU. The conversion rate in the lab was 1 C$ = 12 EU. In 
the field, ,the wage was set at 5, 000 FCF A, and the bribe was set at 1, 000 
FCFA. 
The "High Wage" treatment is identical to the Control treatment except 
that the wage was 40% higher (i.e. 7, 000 FCF A in the field and 350 EU in the 
lab). The "High Bribe" treatment is identical to the Control treatment except 
that the amount of the bribe was doubled (i.e. 2, 000 FC FAin the field and 
100 EU in the lab). Finally, the last treatment makes an attempt at studying 
the effect of monitoring. For practical and ethical reasons, we decided against 
confronting field graders who accepted the bribe. Instead, we introduced a 
mechanism aimed at monitoring the accuracy with which the graders perform 
their task. This indirect approach therefore makes it possible to detect and 
punish corrupt graders when they favor the briber. The monitoring mechanism 
was explained as follows. We told each grader that we would randomly pick 
and re-grade 5 of the 20 papers he spell-checked. Then, we would calculate 
the difference between the number of mistakes reported by the grader and the 
number of mistakes we found in the paper. Only the worst paper graded would 
be considered to de termine the monetary penalty. More precisely, the penalty 
imposed in the field was 2, 000 FC F A when the difference was between 3 and 5 
mistakes, 3, 000 FC F A when the difference was between 6 and 9 mistakes and 
4,500 FC F A when the difference exceeded 10 mistakes. The penalties imposed • 
in the lab were proportional. 13 Except for the risk of being penalized, the "High 
1:1 More precisely, the penalty imposed in the lab was 100 EU when the difference was 
between 3 and 5 mistakes, 150 EU when the difference was between 6 and 9 l11istakes and, 
225 EU when the difference exceeded 10 l11istakes. . 
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Monitoring" treatment is otherwise identical to the Control treatment. 
In total, 166 (respectively 125) subjects participated in the four treatments 
conducted in the field (respectively in the lab). More precisely, in the field 
(lab) , 37 (30) subjects participated in the Control treatment, 40 (31) in the 
High Wage treatment, 45 (32) in the High Bribe treatment, and 44 (32) in the 
High Monitoring treatment. On average, the total earning of a field grader (a 
lab grader) was 6,432.43 FCF A (33.24 C$) in the Control treatment, 8,375.00 
FCF A (36.44 C$) in the High Wage treatment, 7,155.56 FCF A (41.31 C$) 
in the High Bribe treatment, and 4,954.55 FCF A (23.98 C$) in the High 
Monitoring treatment.1-l 
3.4 Comments on the Experimental Design 
To sorne extent, the design we proposed may be interpreted as the out come 
of an optimization problem under constraints: we tried to minimize the pos-
sible losses of control when moving from the lab to the field, subject to the 
constraints imposed by the two environments. We now discuss sorne of the 
issues we faced when designing our experiment, and sorne of the solutions we 
implemented to address these issues. 
Running a field experiment on corruption is complicated by the fact that 
corruption is an illegal activity. As a result, we must be careful not to ask field 
subjects to take actions for which they could be prosecuted. To circumvent 
this problem, we created in Ouagadougou a private and closed environment in 
which to observe behavior. A second constraint was to find a reallife activity 
which may credibly lend itself to corruption in the field. As mentioned earlier, 
I~These amounts include the bribe. 
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corruption in education appears to be prevalent in Burkina Faso, and bribing a 
grader is not uncommon. 15 Another issue was to prevent contamination within 
the subject pool. In particular, we did not want the word to spread that 
the grading task was fake, or that bribes were present in the exam papers. We 
took several actions in order to mitigate this problem: i) we conducted the field 
experiment in a large city; ii) we tried to recruit a geographicaIly diverse subject 
pool; iii) we conducted aIl the sessions within a ten day period; iv) between the 
sessions in which a bribe was offered, we conducted sorne additional sessions 
(not reported here) without bribe; and v) field subjects were informed that they 
participated in an experiment only after aIl sessions had been carried out. 1G 
Our design also reflects sorne of the constraints imposed by traditional lab 
practices. In particular, we did not resort to the use of deception techniques 
(as defined by Hey 1998). This explains why, although their role is essentiaIly 
passive, we used real candidates to type the text. As a result, lab graders 
knew that their decisions could truly impact the financial weIl being of other 
subjects. Likewise, foIlowing lab conventions we chose to preserve the subjects' 
anonymity, although it may be argued that the ability to identify the other 
party is a key feature of real life corruption. 
We took a number of measures in an attempt to mitigate the possible losses 
of control when moving from the lab to the field. In particular, we decided 
to concentrate exclusively on the graders' decisions. As a result, we were able 
to control in both environments the amount of the bribe, the distribution of 
15In fact, a Burkinabe's newspaper ("Le Pays") reported on ~vlarch 7, 2006 that two 
students were caught in a bribery attempt comparable to the one in our experiment. 
l(i Informai conversations during the debriefing sessions suggest that, until it was revealed 
to them, the wide majority of field subjects truly believed that they were hired for a real 
gradil1g task. 
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mistakes in the 20 ex am papers, and the number of mistakes in the bribe 
paper. We also decided to introduce the bribe with a short written message 
. in order to prevent face-to-face communication and informaI bargaining, which 
could have been influenced by the briber's personal characteristics (e.g. gender, 
ethnicity). Finally, we had to choose what information to provide the lab and 
the field graders about the consequences of reporting the bribe attempt. We 
decided to provide information that we felt was of comparable nature in both 
environments. Namely, we told the field graders that reporting the bribe would 
be punished by failure of the exam, and we told the lab graders that this would 
provide no payoff for the candidate. 
Before we conclude this section, we must acknowledge that the experiment 
we designed do es not allow us to tackle entirely the question of external validity 
for corruption experiments. In particular, as the subjects recruited in the field 
are not professional graders, we cannot test whether the endogeneity of the 
subject pool play a role in explaining corrupt behavior. Likewise, our design 
only allows us to analyze one side of the market, Le. we observe the behavior 
of the bribees but not of the bribers. Finally, our one-shot game experiment 
may not fully capture corruption in the field, which may be learned and may 
involve repeated interactions. Nevertheless, following Levitt and List (2007), 
one may argue that our design includes one of the most important features 
for external validity. Namely, in contrast with the lab, subjects in the field 
acted without knowing they were participating in an experiment. As a result, 
our chapter may be considered an important first step in testing the external 
validity of corruption experiments. 
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3.5 Experimental Results 
In this section, we present the results of the lab and field experiments. To ease 
the presentation, we div ide the analysis in three parts. First, we analyze the 
grader's decision to accept or reject the bribe. Then, we look at the number 
of mistakes reported for paper 11, depending on whether or not the grader 
accepted the bribe. Finally, we test whether accepting the bribe affects the 
way subjects subsequently perform their grading task for the remaining nine 
exam papers. 
3.5.1 Decision to Accept the Bribe 
We start with a brief presentation of descriptive statistics. Then, we conduct 
an econometric analysis to identify treatment effects, and test for possible dif-
ferences between the lab and the field. Table 3.1 gives the frequency of the 
bribe acceptance in the different treatments, both in the lab and in the field. 
Let us first concentrate on the results obtained in the labo In the Control treat-
ment, 67% of the subjects accepted the bribe. In other words, nearly one out of 
three graders essentially refused "free money" despite the fact that i) they did 
not incur any risk of being caught and ii) accepting the bribe had no negative 
externality on any other candidate. This rejection rate is slightly higher than 
in comparable lab experiments. 17 We conjecture two potential explanations for 
this result. First, unlike previous corruption experiments, our design requires 
real effort from the briber and the bribee. Second, since most graders are uni-
versity students, they can personally relate to the grading task, and therefore, 
17 For instance, only 9.4% of the subjects in Frank and Schulze (2000) acted honestly even 
though corruption had a negative externality on an actual public entity (Le. a film club). 
Likewise. the rejection rate was only 13.1% in Cameron et al. (2006) in an environ ment with 
negative externalities and possible punishment. 
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they may be less tolerant toward bribery. Table 3.1 also indicates that in the 
lab, increasing the wage reduces the probability of accepting the bribe, while 
monitoring the graders' work or proposing a higher bribe seem to leave this 
probability unchanged. 
As for the field, we can see in Table 3.1 that the probability of acceptance 
in the Control treatment is slightly below 50%. In contrast with the lab, 
this relatively high rejection rate may not be attributable. solely to intrinsic 
motivations. lndeed, it is unlikely that aIl field graders believed that they 
faced absolutely no risk of being caught. In addition, they may have been 
under the impression that helping the briber had negative externalities on the 
other candidates and/or on the institution which administered the exam. Table 
3.1 also indicates that in the field, providing a higher wage and monitoring the 
graders' work seem to lower slightly the probability of accepting the bribe. In 
contrast, the bribe is accepted more often when the amount proposed is larger. 
We now turn to the econometric analysis. To impose as little structure as 
possible, we adopt a semiparametric approach to model the grader's decision 
to accept the bribe. More specifically, we specify a binary response model of 
the form: 
(3.1) 
where A is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when grader i accepts the 
bribe; Xi is a vector of explanatory variables; /3 is a vector of parameters to 
be estimated; li (.) is the indicator function satisfying li (z) = 1 when z is true 
and li (z) = 0 otherwise; and Uj is an unobserved error term. To estimate j3 
without imposing any distributional assumption on U, we adopt the smoothed 
maximum score estimator developed by Horowitz (1992) (see also Horowitz 
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1998 and 2002)yl This estimator can accommodate arbitrary heteroskedastic-
ity of unknown form, it is asymptotically normal and, under sorne smoothness 
conditions, its convergence rate can be made arbitrarily close to ..[N. In other 
words, in terms of the estimator theoretical properties, there is virtually no cost 
in using this semiparametric approach versus a more conventional parametric 
approach. 
In addition to treatment and field dummies, we include several individual 
characteristics to estimate the model in (3.1). In particular, we control for the 
grader's age and gender. We also include a measure of the grader's religious-
ness. This was obtained from the post-experiment survey in which we asked 
the subjects how often they go to a church, a mosque or any other place of 
worship.19 This variable has 5 categories, ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (every 
day). To capture a grader's ability at the grading task, we include two vari-
ables measuring the grader's precision and improvement over the first ten exam 
papers.:'10 These measures are valid instruments since the graders (both in the 
I~If the distribution of U is normal (respectively logistic), then (3.1) is the traditional 
binary probit (respectively, logit) mode!. Both of these distributional assumptions, however, 
are rejected by our data. As shown by (e.g.) Horowitz (2002) such distributional mispecifi-
cations may lead to severely biased estimates of (3. Therefore, we prefer to rely on a more 
robust semiparametric approach. A weil known drawback of the smoothed maximum score 
estimator, however, is that it does not produce m~rginal effects. This is a second order 
issue here sin ce, to address the questions raised in this chapter, we need to correctly identify 
treatment etfects, not marginal etfects. 
\!)We did not anticipate the survey responses to play such a role in explaining behavior. In 
hindsight, we should have collected additional personal information about e.g. the subjects' 
wealth and occupation. 
2oTo measure a grader's precision, we averaged over the first ten exam papers the absolute 
deviation between the number of mistakes he or she reported and the true number of mistakes. 
The variable "Precision" was then set equal to the opposite of this average. "Precision" is 
therefore a negative number, and a grader is considered more precise when this variable 
increases toward O. To llleasure a grader's improvement, we calculated for each of the first 
ten exam papers the absolute percentage deviation between the number of mistakes he or she 
reported and the true number of mistakes. We then regressed for each grader the opposite 
of this variable on a constant and the exam number. The variable "Improvement" was then 
set equal to the estimated slope in this regression. A grader is therefore considered to have 
illlproved at the grading task when "Illlprovement" is positive and large. 
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field and in the lab) are unaware of the presence of corruption until they reach 
paper Il. Finally, the econometric model accounts for the time the grader took 
to complete the grading task. 21 
The descriptive statistics provided in Table 3.2 indicate that the individ-
uaI characteristics vary markedly between the field and the labo In particular, 
observe that although it took the field subjects longer to complete their task, 
they are slightly less accurate at grading the first 10 papers. Note also that 
the average lab grader is less religious, and more likely to be a woman. By 
controlling these individual characteristics, the econometric analysis allows us 
to disent angle intrinsic differences between the lab and the field, from differ-
ences in the composition of the subject pools. In other words, we will be 
able to test whether two individuals with identical observable characteristics 
behave differently in each environment. In addition, the econometric analysis 
will allow us to test which of these individual characteristics may be considered 
micro-determinants of corruption. 
The results of the estimation are reported in Table 3.3.22 In terms of indi-
vidual characteristics, we find that an older, a more religious or a more precise 
grader is significantly less likely to accept the bribe.23 It is worth noting that, 
to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to identify religious fervor, 
21The parameter !3 in (3.1) is only identified up to a multiplicative factor. Following 
the conventional approach, the scale normalization consists here in setting the parameter 
associated with one of the variables equal to l. In the estimations that follow, the variable 
selected for the scale normalization is the time the grader took to complete the grading task. 
22The estimates presented in the paper are bias corrected. To account for the finiteness of 
the sam pie, the standard deviations of the estimates, as weil as the distributions of the test 
statistics have been evaluated by bootstrap. 
2:1 Note that these results do not appear to be specific to the environment in which the data 
was collected. In particubi.r, although the value of the parameters !ue alfected, the direction 
and the significance of the individual characteristics remain unchanged when we estimate 
the model with the data collected solely in the lab, or solely in the field. 
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and ability as micro-determinants of corruption. Table 3.3 also indicates that 
gender does not appear to influence significantly the decision to accept the 
bribe. This result is somewhat surprising as previous lab experiments suggest 
that women are less corruptible (Frank and Schulze 2000, and Rivas 2006). It 
also contrasts with a commonly held belief among practitioners that women 
are less susceptible than men to accept bribes.24 
Before testing for possible differences between the lab and the field, we look 
at general treatment effects. We can see in Table 3.3 that, compared to the 
Control treatment, increasing the wage paid to graders reduces significantly 
the probability of accepting the bribe. This result is consistent with the lab 
experiments of Barr et al. (2004) and Jacquemet (2005), and with several em-
pirical analyses.25 It is also in line with the views of numerous practitioners 
and international institutions, who often recommend to pay civil servants up 
to, or even above their private sect or alternative as a mean to deter corrup-
tion.26 Table 3.3 also indicates that proposing a higher bribe and monitoring 
do not affect significantly the grader's decision to accept the bribe. The first 
result contrasts with previous lab experiments in which a positive relationship 
between the bribe level and corruption has been identified (Abbink et al. 2002, 
Jacquemet 2005). The lack of efficacy of monitoring is not that surprising. 
lndeed, recall that the type of monitoring we implemented was not aimed at 
2~ For instance, the police department in Mexico City decided in 1999 to dispatch women 
traffic officers at sensitive intersections because they were deemed less corruptible than their 
male counterparts. See e.g. the August 15, 1999 New York Times article available online at 
http://query.nytimes.com/ gst / fullpage.html"?res=940CE7DAI239F936A2575BCOA96F958260&n= 
Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/P /Police%20Brutality%20and%20Misconduct). 
25See e.g. van Rijckeghem and Weber (2001) or Ait and Lassen (2003). 
2(; Singapore and Hong Kong are often presented as successful examples of such a policy. 
Indeed, these countries are typically ranked among the least corrupt, and, they are known 
to pay high salaries to their civil servants. In particular, the prime minister of Singapore is 
pa id several times more than the U .S. president. 
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catching the graders who aceept the bribe. Instead, it was designed to catch 
corrupt graders who reciprocate by giving a good grade to the briber. 
To identify possible differenees between the lab and the field, we included in 
the econometric model a dummy variable for each treatment conducted in the 
field. We only find a single significant differenee between the two environments. 
Namely, a higher bribe increases the probability of acceptanee in the field, while 
it appears to have no effect in the labo This result may indicate that subjects 
have different priee elasticities in the lab and in the field. It may also sim ply 
reflect a pure level effect. Indeed, although the bribe is raised by the same factor 
in the two environments, the amount of the raise is different in the field and in 
the labo The lack of statistical differences between the two environments, also 
implies that the direction and the magnitude of the "High Wage" treatment 
effect are the same in the lab and in the field. This result is remarkable as it 
suggests that, at least in sorne dimensions, corruption experiments conducted in 
the lab in a developed country and in the field in a developing country are fully 
consistent. The econometric analysis also reveals that the differenees in the 
acceptance rate between the lab and the field (see Table 3.1) can be explained 
in large part by the composition of the subject pool in each environment. In 
. other words, onee we control for the subjects' observable characteristics, there 
do es not seem to be any genuine difference between the two environments, 
except in the "High Bribe" treatment. 
3.5.2 Decision to Report a Failing Grade 
Do graders who accept the bribe tend to favor the briber? To address this ques-
tion, we concentrate here on the most relevant decision made by the grader: 
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whether or not to report a failing grade (Le. more than 15 mistakes) for paper 
11.2ï The descriptive statistics in Table 3.1 indicate that graders who accept 
the bribe tend to fail paper Il less often, regardless of the treatment or envi-
ronment. Observe, however, that they do not systematically report a passing 
grade. Therefore, a non-negligible number of graders act opportunistically by 
taking the bribe and doing nothing in return. 
To confirm that corrupt graders favor the briber, we estimate a binary 
response model similar to (3.1) in which the dependent variable takes the value 
1 when the number of mistakes reported by the grader for paper 11 exceeds 
15 mistakes. The results are reported in Table 3.4.28 Observe first that after 
controlling for individual characteristics and treatment effects, we can confirm 
that graders who accept the bribe are significantly less likely to fail the bribe 
paper, and that their behavior does not vary significantly between the lab and 
the field. 
In terms of the influence of individual characteristics, we find that, all else 
equal, women and more religious graders are less likely to fail the briber. In 
contrast, despite playing a role in explaining the decision to accept the bribe, 
the age of the grader appears to have no effect. Finally, and not surprisingly, 
the probability to find more than 15 mistakes in paper Il is positively correlated 
27 An analysis based on the actual gracie reported for paper Il yields essentially the same 
conclusions. 
28The econometric models for the decision to accept the bribe and the decision to report 
a failing grade have beell estimated separately. Althollgh this is consistent with the timing 
of the events, it is also conceivable that a grader checked the bribe paper before accepting 
the bribe. To test this hypothesis we estimated a bivariate binary response model in which 
the two decisiolls are modeled jOilltly. We find that the correlation between the error tenns 
in each equation is not Hignificantly dilferent from zero, thereby rejecting the hypotheHis of 
a joint decision. This does not imply, however, that we consider the two decisions to be 
nncorrelated. Illdeèd, by illclnding a dummy for the bribe acceptance when eHtimatillg the 
decision to report a failillg grade, we are only imposing that the error tenus in the two l1lodels 
HIe independent. 
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with the grader's overall ability. As we shall see in the results presented next, 
most of these individual effects are consistent across graders, regardless of their 
decision to accept or reject the bribe. 
No general treatment effect emerges from this econometric estimation with 
pooled data. As shown next, this may be explained by the fact that the treat-
ments essentially affected the subjects who accepted the bribe. Observe, how-
ever, that even after controlling for their initial grading precision, women are 
significantly more likely to fail paper Il in the High Monitoring treatment. 
This result is consistent with Frank and Schulze (2000) and Schulze and Frank 
(2003), who find that women are more responsive to monitoring and punish-
ment. Note also that this behavior is robust as it is not significantly affected by 
the environment in which the experiment was conducted, and, as shown below, 
by the grader's decision to accept or reject the bribe. 
To gain a better understanding of behavior, we now div ide our sample in two 
groups depending on whether or not the grader accepted the bribe.29 We can 
see in Table 3.5 that the estimation results obtained for rejecters are consistent 
with those just presented.30 In contrast, the behavior of accepters seems to be 
influenced by different factors. In particular, among accepters, an older more 
2!)We refer to graders who accepted the bribe as "accepters", and graders who reported the 
bribe as "rejecters". Note also that by splitting our sample we may introduce unobserved 
heterogeneity. Recall, however, that our semi-parametric estimation method can acconllUO-
date arbitrary heteroskedasticity of unknown fonu. In fact, we find essentially the same 
results when the models for accepters and rejecters are estimated jointly. 
:IOThe results obtained for rejecters should be interpreted with some degree of caution. 
lndeed, although they were instructed to grade paper 11 like any other exam paper, subjects 
both in the lab and in the field were informed that reporting the bribery attempt would 
result in failure for the candidate. One may therefore wonder whether the rejecters gave 
their best effort when grading the bribe paper. Two p~eces of evidence seem to refute this 
hypothesis. Fin;t, an econometric analysis indicates that rejecters graded paper 11 with 
similar accuracy as the other first 10 papers. Second, the grades reported by rejecters for 
paper Il in the Control treatment are not significantly different from those reported in an 
additional treatment we conducted in which no bribe was provided. 
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able male is more likely to fail the briber. In terms of treatment effects, we find 
that providing a higher wage decreases the probability that an accepter reports 
a failing grade. In other words, although graders are less likely to take the 
bribe when they receive a higher wage, those who accept tend to reciprocate 
more often by giving the briber a passing grade. Once again, the parameter 
associated with the "High Wage" dummy variable in the field is not significant. 
ln other words, the direction and the magnitude of the "High Wage" treatment 
effeçt is statistically indistinguishable between the lab and the field. The only 
significant difference between the two environments is related to the effect of 
a higher bribe. Indeed, compared to the Control treatment, accepters in the 
field are more likely to reciprocate by providing a passing grade to the briber, 
while increasing the bribe does not influence the grade reported by accepters 
in the labo 
3.5.3 Corruption and Subsequent Performance 
We now test whether accepting the bribe affects how well a subject subsequently 
grades the remaining nine exam papers. To do so, we exploit the panel structure 
of the data collected in the experiment to estimate a model orthe form: 
Yi t = 0:' Xi t + Ui t . , . (3.2) 
where the grading quality is defined as Yi,t = -INli,t - Mo,tl, Mi,t is the number 
of mistakes reported by subject i for exam paper t (t = 12, ... ,20), and A1o,t is 
the actual number of mistakes in exam paper t.:n The vector of explanatory 
variables Xi,t includes the two variables measuring the initial ability of grader 'i 
:11 To eliminate possible "exam paper" specifie etfects, the dependent variable Yu has been 
centered by subtracting its mean calculated over ail graders. 
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over the first ten exam papers (Le. "Precision" and "Improvement" defined in 
foot note 20). As we shall see, these variables capture most of the variation in 
grading quality across subjects.:n To test whether grader 'i keeps improving as 
he or she did over ,the first ten exam papers, we control for i) the exam number 
t, and ii) the exam number multiplied by the value of variable "Improvement" 
for subject 'i. We also include in Xi.,t the time the subject took to complete the 
grading task, as well as various dummy variables for the decision to accept the 
bribe, the decision to fail the bribe paper, the environment, and the treatments. 
Finally, to control for possible grader specific random effects, we model the error 
term as Ui,t = Ci + Vi,t, where Var(Vi,t) = a2 , Var (cd = a~ when subject 'i is 
an accepter and Var (Ci) = a; when subject i is a rejecter. 
The results reported in Table 3.6 indicate that the parameters associated 
with the variables "Precision" and, to a lesser extent, "Improvement" are highly 
significant. This therefore confirms that most of the variation in grading qual-
ity over last nine papers may be explained by the subjects' initial abilities. 
The trend parameter is negative and significant, thereby indicating an overall 
decline in grading quality over the last 9 exam papers. The parameter associ-
ated with the variable "Improvement * t" is close to, but significantly greater 
than zero. In other words, we find a persistence in improvement, whereby (all 
else equal) subjects whose initial grading improved (respectively deteriorated) 
over the first 10 exam papers, keep improving (deteriorating) after the bribe 
paper. Once we control for differences in initial ability, we find that subjects 
who accept the bribe are significantly less precise when grading the last nine 
:
12 1n particular, the ei:itill1ations of alternative specifications indicate that accounting for 
;'Precii:iion" and H1ll1provell1ent" is sufficient to capture general treatll1ent effects, individual 
characteristics, as weil as general c\ifferences between the lab and the field. These variables 
are therefore not incluc\ed in the moùel ei:itimated in this i:iection. 
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exam papers. This lack of precision is even more pronounced among accepters 
who gave the briber a passing grade. Moreover, the standard error of the 
individual specific effect is significantly larger for the accepters than for the· 
rejecters (i.e. (; a > (; r)' In other words, the grading of accepters, and more 
specifically accepters who helped the briber, becomes more inconsistent and 
less accurate. To explain this result, we conjecture that accepters may prefer 
to appear incompetent rather than corrupt. Observe also that accepters do 
a significantly better grading job over the last nine exam papers in the High 
Monitoring treatment. In other words, it appears that accepters best respond 
to monitoring in an effort to lower their e~pected penalty.33 FinaIly, we are 
once again unable to detect any significant difference between the lab and the 
field. Indeed, none of the parameters associated with variables controlling for 
the environment are significantly different from zero. 
3.6 Conclusion 
As argued by several international institutions (e.g. the IMF or the World 
Bank), corruption is one of the most detrimental factors currently afRicting 
the economies of developing countries. Due in part to its secret ive nature, 
economists have had limited success in their effort to understand and combat 
corruption. Recently, the micro-determinants of corruption, as weIl as possible 
anti-corruption measures have been tested in laboratory experiments conducted 
in developed countries. If shown to be externally valid (Le. to be relevant for 
:1:IWe are unable to detect a significant difference between the accepters who did or did 
not fail the briber. This result may be partially explained by the fact that accepters tend 
to report fewer mistakes for the bribe paper, even when they fail the briber. Doing a better 
grading job over the last nine exam papers is therefore a best response for both kinds ·of 
accepters. 
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the real world) , then laboratory experiments cou Id become one of the most 
effective tools to study corruption. One may wonder, however, whether the 
insights gained in the lab in a developed country can be extrapolated to where 
it matters the most, the field in a developing country. 
In an attempt to address this question, we conducted the same corruption 
experiment in the lab in Montreal (Canada), and in the field in Ouagadougou 
(Burkina Faso). The key difference between the two environments is that sub-
jects in the field acted without knowing they were participating in an experi-
ment. In short, our design aimed at reproducing a corruption scenario in which 
a candidate proposes a bribe to a grader in order to obtain a better grade. We 
conducted four different treatments, each in the lab and in the field, by varying 
successively i) the amount of the bribe, ii) the wage paid to graders, and iii) 
the level of monitoring and punishment. 
An econometric analysis of the data collected in the lab and in the field 
reveals several micro-determinants of corrupt behavior. In particular, we find 
that the probability to accept a bribe decreases with the grader's age, reli-
giousness and ability at the grading task. In addition, our results suggest that 
women may be more responsive to monitoring and punishment. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first study to identify religiousness and ability as 
micro-determinants of corruption. 
Once we control for these individual characteristics, we find the direction 
and the magnitude of several treatment effects to be statistically indistinguish-
able between the lab and the field. In particular, increasing the grader's wage 
reduces the probability that he will accept the bribe in both environments. In 
other words, we do not identify any intrinsic difference between the two en-
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vironments, in the sense that the behaviors of two individuals with identical 
observable characteristics are not statistically different in the field and in the 
labo This is encouraging as it suggests that, at least in sorne dimensions, the 
results of corruption experiments conducted in the lab in a developed country 
carry over to the field in a developing country. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1 
. ~ . ~ ... ... - .. ,,- . , -. 
Descriptive Statlsties 
.. ," 
Treatment Control High Wage High Bribe High 
En\1ronment* Lab Field Lab Field Lab Field Lab Field 
# of subjects 30 37 31 40 32 45 32 44 
% of graders who took the bribe 0.667 0.487 0.484 0.375 0.656 0.689 0.656 0.409 
% of graders who Ali 0.667 0.649 0.548 0.436 0.656 0.422 0.656 0.698 
reported more Accepters 0.600 0.556 0.400 0.267 0.619 0.355 0.667 0.667 than 15 mistakes 
for Exam 11 Rejecters 0.800 0.737 0.688 0.542 0.727 0.571 0.636 0.720 
* The lab experiment was conducted in Montreal (Canada), and the field ex periment in 
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). 
Table 3.2 
Subject Pool Characteristlcs 
Age Female Religiousness lime (in Min) 
Lab Field Lab Field Lab 
A\erage 26.26 24.86 0.41 0.16 0.83 
Std Dev 6.32 2.24 0.49 0.36 1.06 
Min 18 20 a 0 0 
Max 54 33 1 1 3 4 
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Table 3.3 
Binary Response Model for the Decision to Accept 
the Bribe 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
Age -0.689' ** (0.349) 
Female -0.752, (0.734) 
Religiousness -1.128 *** (0.437) 
Precision -0.943. ** (0.478) 
Impro\A9ment -0.455 ** (0.437) 
High Wage Treatment -1.382' ** (0.684) 
High Bribe Treatment -0.686\ (0.653) 
High Monitoring Treatment -0.432: (1.116) 
Field* Control Treatment -1.103' (0.749) 
Field*High Wage Treatment -0.560. (0.694) 
Field*High Bribe Treatment 1.431, ** (0.726) 
Field*High Monitoring Treatment 0.130 i (0.925) 
Constant 0.901: (0.667) 
Number of Obs. 291 
Table 3.4 
Binary Response Model for the Decision to Report a 
Failing Grade 
(Model Estlmated with Ali Subjects) 
Inde pendent Variables Coefficients 
Age 0.093~ (0.408) 
Female -1.932; *** (0.542) 
Religiousness -0.679: ** (0.234) 
Precision -0.692: ** (0.364) 
Impro\A9ment 0.006, ** (0.285) 
Accept -1.252: ** (0.551) 
Accept*Field 0.264! (0.632) 
High Wage Treatment -0.2031 (0.527) 
High Bribe Treatment 0.229' (0.618) 
High Monitoring Treatment -0.465i (0.546) 
Field* Control Treatment -0.292: (0.695) 
Field*High Wage Treatment -0.708! (0.636) 
Field*High Bribe Treatment -0.134: (0.779) 
Field*High Monitoring Treatment 0.584: (0.790) 
Female*High Monitoring 2.067: ** 1.048 
Female*Field*High Monitoring 2.2341 1.709 
Constant 1.341' ** (0.563) 
Number of Obs. 291 
Slgnlficance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 3.5 
Binary Response Model for the Decision to Report a Failing Grade 
(Model Estimated with Accepters or Rejecters) 
Independent Variables Accepters Rejecters 
Age 1.275 ** (0.540) -0.208! (0.366) 
Female -3.123:***(0.886) -3.469' * (2.147) 
Religiousness 0.301 ' '(0.366) -1.182' ** (0.454) 
Precision 1.572 *** (0.402) 1.139' ** (0.573) 
Improwment 0.593 ** (0.265) 0.047! (0.532) 
High Wage Treatment -2.679 ** (0.828) -1.818: (2.173) 
High Bribe Treatment 0.653 '(0.752) -1.338! (2.435) 
High Monitoring Treatment -1.116 '(0.825) -4.562: (3.072) 
Field* Control Treatment -0.356 (0.660) -2.170: (2.959) 
Field*High Wage Treatment 0.500 (2.821 ) -2.355; (2.146) 
Field*High Bribe Treatment -1.599 ** (0.745) -1.387\ (2.502) 
Field*High Monitoring Treatment 1.413 (1.628) 0.3831 (0.762) 
Female*High Monitoring 3.990 * (2.277)' 4.596; * (2.846) 
Female*Field*High Monitoring -0.537 '(2.446) -
Constant 1.948'*** (0.605) 4.864 * (2.888) 
Number of Obs. 159 132 
Table 3.6 
Grading Quality after the Bribe 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
Precision 0.598; *** (0.084) 
Impro\ement 0.347! ** (0.177) 
t 0.090! ** (0.042) 
Impro\ement*t 0.055i ** (0.020) 
lime -0.282' (0.367) 
Accept -1.684*** (0.404) 
Accept*Pass -0.785; *** (0.252) 
Accept*High Wage Treatment 0.5751 (0.369) 
Accept* High Bribe Treatment 0.454; (0.336) 
Accept*High Monitoring Treatment -0.9341 ** (0.365) 
Field -0.472; (0.358) 
Field* Accept 0.172: (0.352) 
Field*Pass -0.045i (0.242) 
Constant 4.378i *** (0.773) 
cr 2.457! *** . (0.11 0) 
cr accepters 1.219i*** (0.106) 
cr rejecters 0.930:*** (0.128) 
Number of Obs. 2619 
Number of Graders 291 
Notes: i)*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; ii) the number of 
observations is the number of graders multiplied by 9, the . 
number of papers after paper 11. 
'" ._,,, ~~" "'" '~~~'~""._~""M'~~' 
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